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Chapter 2: Business groups are an essential feature of economic and social or-
ganization across the world. As such, they provide a compelling empirical and
theoretical tool for improving our understanding of the ownership and control
of organizations outside of the Anglo-American tradition. However, widely in-
corporating business groups into analyses of regions like the Middle East has
been limited by the availability of information on group membership. This pa-
per seeks to advance the comparative study of corporate governance by demon-
strating a method for inferring these groups with data on director-firm and
ownership networks of publicly traded companies using data for 1336 listed
firms from 12 Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) re-
gion. Group-level measures are then calculated based on information aggre-
gated from firms affiliated with each potential group. These data are used to
support the validity of the communities by showing that—based on scores of
family influence, geographic heterogeneity, and government ownership—it is
possible to identify groups corresponding to one of these specific and measur-
able axes of solidarity.
Chapter 3: Although business groups have been intensely studied in regions
like Latin America and East Asia, the literature on the Middle East and North
Africa is relatively less developed; the sparsity of this research is a pressing
concern because of the variety of ways in which business groups have been
shown to influence the political allocation of economic resources in these other
parts of the world. This study presents evidence for the value-relevance of fam-
ily business groups, government ownership, and other inter-firm relationships
among 1110 publicly traded firms in 12 countries in the Middle East and North
Africa. Due to the difficulty in obtaining direct observations of business group
membership, business groups are inferred with methods from network analysis.
Next, I apply a Bayesian multilevel model to estimate the associations between
group-comembership(as well as other relationships), and pairwise stock returns
correlations. Using the results of the model, I perform an exploratory analysis
of the correlations between exchange-level attributes and estimated coefficient
values, finding that, despite the small number of exchanges, minority-investor
protections appear to be associated with stronger value-relevance of business
groups.
Chapter 4: We use a novel data set of the outcomes of 18125 loan guarantee
transactions attempted by Chinese public firms between 2008 and 2015 to study
banks’ reactions to related party transactions in the context of ongoing marketi-
zation reforms. We find that guaranteed loans with better governed guarantors
from more marketized provinces are more likely to succeed, that the influence
of political ties is contingent on the ownership structure of the guarantor, and
that the embeddedness of the transaction in multiplex relationships between the
guarantor and bank increases the likelihood of approval.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is composed of three papers that investigate the relation-
ships between inter-organizational networks, business groups, and emerging
financial markets. More specifically, Chapter 2 presents a procedure for using
existing community detection methods to infer the business group affiliations
of over 1100 firms in the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa.
Chapter 3 seeks to confirm these results by using the inferred groups to pre-
dict the degree of pairwise stock price co-movement between firms. Chapter
4 analyzes the interactions between networks, business groups, and financial
transactions using a unique data set of attempted loan guarantee transactions
in China from 2008 to 2015.
These interrelated papers make several contributions to the economic soci-
ology of emerging financial markets. First, Chapter 2 builds on the definition of
business groups provided by Granovetter (2010) as well as empirical work by
Khanna and Rivkin (2006) in seeking to establish whether it is possible to link
mathematically derived clusters in inter-firm networks with the socially con-
structed idea of business groups. In doing so, it exposes broad regularities in the
types of traces that business groups create in formal networks across a variety
of countries, especially in terms of family control, government ownership, and
geographical location. Chapter 3 takes as its point of departure the finding that
firms within the same business group have correlated stock returns (Khanna
and Thomas 2009). The motivating idea is similar to Chapter 2 in that just as
business groups leave their mark on formal networks, their influence should
also be evident in a weighted network of pairwise price correlations. The results
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support this hypothesis, and finding traces of the same inferred groups in mul-
tiple, independently generated networks supports the validity of the method.
Through the use of a multilevel model it also sheds light on the cross-national
variation in the relevance of family business groups, which is important given
the scarcity of such broad analyses (Davis 2012; Aguilera and Jackson 2010; Colli
and Colpan 2016).
Finally, Chapter 4, which was co-authored with Lisha Liu, switches focus
from the inductive study of business groups in the Middle East and North
Africa to a deductive analysis of guaranteed loans in China. Our model seeks to
integrate findings from three strands of literature. First, we use our transaction-
level data set to analyze whether banks respond to the corporate governance of
guarantor firms, providing a further characterization of the evolving relation-
ship between controlling and minority investors in China (Liu and Lu 2007; Jia
et al. 2013; He et al. 2013). Second, we use a variety of measures to analyze the
role of firms’ political connections in securing loan guarantees. This has directly
relevance for the large literature on political capital in China’s transition econ-
omy (e.g. Nee and Opper 2010; Haveman et al. 2017). Finally, our most novel
contributions builds on the idea of the embeddedness of economic and financial
transactions within a wider set of social relationships (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi
1999; Zhou et al. 2003). Our question is thus whether and under what conditions
firms are more likely to receive a guarantee in the presence of such multiplex ties
or a history of successful transactions. We also investigate whether the above
relationships are contingent on the type of bank involved.
2
CHAPTER 2
IDENTIFYING AND CLASSIFYING BUSINESS GROUPS IN 12 ARAB
COUNTRIES
2.1 Introduction
Business groups, like firms or states, are an essential feature of the organization
of economic life, and a wealth of case-studies has demonstrated their diversity
and geographical extent (Khanna and Yafeh 2007; Young et al. 2008; Granovet-
ter 2010; Carney et al. 2011). Nevertheless, analysis of business groups can be
limited by the availability of data, and the frequent use of country case-studies
reflects the difficulty of observing business group membership in aggregate. As
side effect of this practical difficulty, researchers’ preference for countries where
they are more likely to obtain data necessarily paints a selective picture of how
groups operate, and little work has been done to analyze and describe business
groups in the Middle East and Africa (though see Hearn 2014; Hearn et al. 2017,
for two recent exceptions).
This paper advances business group research by using network analysis to
identify business groups across the Arab states of the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) region. First, I explore the clustering of publicly traded firms
in the region with a community-detection algorithm that searches for the com-
mon structure latent in two separate inter-firm networks. Next, I focus on the
communities generated in the first stage and classify each set of firms according
to an measurable basis of solidarity. Finally, I discuss specific examples of the
business groups I identify and conclude by presenting possibilities for employ-
ing and improving the method.
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This two-pronged analysis provides the first descriptive and comparative
account of business groups in the contemporary MENA region and thereby al-
lows for a rough estimate of the importance and diversity of business groups
in the area. The broader purpose of the method is to enable the inclusion of
business group membership in future analyses of firm outcomes. This has im-
portant implications for policy, especially in the field of corporate governance,
since it allows researchers and practitioners to avoid the assumption that firms
behave as independent or isolated actors and instead consider the latent struc-
tural factors that influence firm behavior. Furthermore, this study is an example
of applying the tools of big data research to policy-relevant problems, especially
in terms of increasing the transparency of important social, political, and eco-
nomic structures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes
previous work on business groups. The method section presents the data and
outlines the procedure for using publicly-available information on firm net-
works to infer group membership. The results section combines the exploratory
partitioning of these firm networks into overlapping clusters with an analysis
of cluster-level properties to show that this approach reveals potential groups
characterized by varying levels of family control, government ownership, and
foreignness. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of implications, limitations,
and next steps.
4
2.2 Business Groups, Networks, and Corporate Governance
2.2.1 Defining Business Groups
A major achievement of the business group literature has been its transforma-
tion from scattered case-studies into a thriving area of research that spans the
disciplines of sociology, management, finance, and economics. For example,
Strachan’s (1976) early study of business groups in Nicaragua continues to in-
fluence current work due to its rich ethnographic account, and can be seen as
a precursor to the numerous investigations of Korean and Japanese business
groups prompted by the rapid economic growth of East-Asian economies dur-
ing the Cold War (Orru´ et al. 1989; Steers et al. 1989; Biggart 1990; Kim 1991).
This research helped foster a growing awareness of business groups as a concept
positioned somewhere between the hierarchy of a firm and the decentralization
of a market (Granovetter 1995), and subsequent work has tended to follow a
common template of purchasing or collecting data on the business groups in
a particular country and analyzing their impact on outcomes like firm perfor-
mance.
Overall, however, the findings of this literature have been mixed, and two
recent summaries both conclude that rather than having a uniform and measur-
able impact on firm performance, business groups appear to operate differently
in different contexts (Khanna and Yafeh 2007; Carney et al. 2011). While this
contingency is frustrating from a policy perspective, it is an inherent feature of
business groups. Unlike the limited liability firm or the nation-state, business
groups are not defined with reference to global standards or norms. Instead,
available evidence suggests that they tend to emerge as a response to local con-
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ditions or as a result of economic elites moving to consolidate their privileged
positions (Colpan et al. 2010). As a result, determining which companies do
or do not constitute a business group can be a significant challenge, and while
single-country studies are free to rely on local criteria, theoretical or compara-
tive treatments are obliged to identify areas of common ground.
Shared definitions tend to emphasize three features in particular. First, it is
essential that the firms within a group be legally independent. Large conglom-
erates are thus excluded on the grounds that they too much resemble a single
large firm (Colpan et al. 2010). Second, these independent firms are bound by
some combination of formal and informal ties, whose exact content can take va-
riety of forms. One key regularity, however, is that ownership is neither neces-
sary nor sufficient for group membership (Granovetter 1995; Khanna and Yafeh
2007; Colpan et al. 2010). This is despite a narrower conception of business
groups in some economic studies that stems from a substantive concern with
the ability of pyramidal ownership structures to expropriate funds from minor-
ity shareholders (Bertrand et al. 2002; Bae et al. 2002; Morck et al. 2005). Third,
these ties should persist over time. This rules out temporary alliances or purely
transactional forms affiliation that may easily arise or dissolve with changing
circumstances.
Beyond these three points scholars tend to emphasize other traits depend-
ing on their area of interest. For example, Guillen (2000, p.362) includes the
criterion that groups “are active in a wide variety of industries”, reflecting his
concern with diversification. As Granovetter (2010) argues in his sociological ac-
count of the business group literature, many other potential defining attributes
of business groups in fact vary considerably across contexts, and this includes
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key areas such as the extent of centralized authority, dominance by financial
institutions, and relationships with the state.
In contrast with the studies cited above, the analysis of this paper does not
begin with direct observations of group membership, and as a result a clear
working definition of what can plausibly be defined as a business group is even
more essential. The Method section describes the basis for using a community
detection algorithm developed by Mucha et al. (2010) to search for sets of firms
that satisfy the consensus definition presented above. Key empirical support for
this approach to detecting business groups is provided by Khanna and Rivkin
(2006) in their study of the predictors of group co-membership, but given the
lack of direct observations, the first part this analysis should be considered ex-
ploratory. The primary challenge of this approach is that community detection
methods necessarily assign each firm to at least one cluster, regardless of that
community’s underlying significance. To mitigate this concern, I focus on an
additional aspect of business groups that is often ignored in formal analyses,
the underlying basis of solidarity in each group responsible for maintaining the
permanence and cohesion of group ties.
In his summary of early business group research, Granovetter (1995) gives
a definition that covers the three areas noted by later authors but goes on to
argue that business groups are distinguished from other collections of firms by
“the existence of social solidarity and social structure among component firms”.
This solidarity can take a wide variety of forms, and while family is the most
widely studied example (Morck and Yeung 2004; Luo and Chung 2005; Masulis
et al. 2011), others include religion, ethnicity, geography, and state control. This
insight serves as a foundation for the second phase of my analysis. Generat-
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ing measures for three of these sources—family, geography, and state control—
provides a crucial opportunity to confirm or reject the salience of the clusters
from the first stage based on measuring potential sources of that group’s cohe-
sion.
2.2.2 Business Groups and the Economy
Research on business groups is motivated by both their ubiquity and impor-
tance. Recent efforts to collect and synthesize our knowledge on the topic paint
a rich, if incomplete picture. For example, Carney et al. (2011) include 141 stud-
ies in 28 countries as part of their meta-analysis, and this sample overlaps with
many of the most commonly studied countries covered by Khanna and Yafeh
(2007) and Colpan et al. (2010). As for their economic importance, reliable global
estimates are not available, and we rely on country-level studies. In Turkey,
which along with Israel is the only state in the MENA region where business
groups have been studied in detail, business group members employed over
400,000 people in 2005 (Colpan 2010). At the firm level, estimating the propor-
tion of affiliated firms in a country is usually only possible for the population of
listed firms, and Khanna and Yafeh (2007) report ratios of approximately 50%
for Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey,
while Chile, Israel, Mexico, and the Philippines range from around 30% to 20%.
These figures raise an important question. If business groups are so
widespread and influential, why do measurements tend to be so selective? On
a practical level, much of our knowledge about organizations and their rela-
tionships is derived from legally mandated disclosures. While a comparative
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account of the legality and regulation of business groups across the world is be-
yond the scope of this paper, the simplest explanation is that corporate law of-
ten ignores business groups and hence makes no demand for their widespread
disclosure (Granovetter 1995). Of course, this ignores the substantial variation
in country-level practices, but on an anecdotal level researchers report using a
combination of interviews, surveys, and private data to obtain data on group
membership (Guillen 2000; Fisman 2001; Khanna and Rivkin 2006).
Situated in the nebulous middle-ground between firm- and country-level
analyses, the difficulty of measuring group affiliation contrasts with well estab-
lished traditions of studying these two fundamental aspects of the organization
of economic, political, and social life. Nevertheless, research comparing group
members and unaffiliated firms continues to show that business groups should
not be ignored. For example, a recent study of Korean firms before and after
the 1997 Asian financial crisis shows how intra-group capital transfers enabled
high-growth members to mitigate the effects of the crisis relative to their unaffil-
iated peers (Almeida et al. 2015). The transfer of resources among a set of tightly
knit firms is a fundamental mechanism largely unavailable to firms outside of
the trust, solidarity, and obligation engendered by business groups. Still, the
impacts of such coordination are not always positive. Sociological studies of the
embeddedness of economic behavior within webs social relations have demon-
strated the costs of such redistribution to successful firms, and business groups
are no exception (Lincoln et al. 1996; Uzzi 1997). This type of leveling might be
consensual for firms who value the stability and other benefits of group mem-
bership more than their cost in redistributed profits, but business groups are
nonetheless notorious for their role in undermining legally sanctioned and for-
malized institutions which may or may not reflect their informal patterns of
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coordination.
Indeed, the recent impeachment of South Korean president Park Geun-
hye—the daughter of the dictator credited with establishing the chaebol as the
key institution of the modern South Korean economy—over her top aide’s so-
licitation of bribes from the country’s major business groups demonstrates the
potentially explosive nature of these informal networks of political and eco-
nomic power. The public airing of such corruption is the exception rather than
the rule, but business groups are also accused of other, more easily observed
abuses. Chief among these is the expropriation of the returns owed to minor-
ity shareholders by the controlling interests within a group (Bertrand et al. 2002;
Bae et al. 2002). The prevalence of this type of behavior is an empirical question,
but its implications for financial development are dire (Porta et al. 2002; Young
et al. 2008). To wit, if investors conclude that they are likely to experience such
treatment when investing in a particular firms or country, they will reduce the
amount of capital they are willing to provide for a given amount of ownership,
perhaps to the point of being unwilling to invest at all.
2.2.3 Business Groups and Corporate Governance
Compared with firm-level analyses of business group membership and per-
formance, this last point touches on a deeper and less immediately tractable
problem facing the students of business groups, namely their relationship with
country-level institutional environments. Scholars have long maintained that
business groups arise in response to poor market institutions that make it diffi-
cult for firms to raise capital and hire talented employees (Guillen 2000; Khanna
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and Palepu 2000; Yiu et al. 2005), but even if this is generally true, the increased
capabilities of group members might reduce their incentive to improve the gen-
eral environment.
The plausibility of this type of causal mechanism has important implications
for how we perceive business groups. A further consequence of the business
group literature’s reliance on single country studies is that there is little room
for analyzing variation in group- or country-level outcomes, and as such this
work tends to operationalize business groups at the firm-level with a simple
binary indicator of group membership. In contrast, the goal of this paper is
to remove the onerous data-collection constraints faced scholars who wish to
investigate the role of business groups outside of commonly studied countries
like Korea, Japan, India, or Chile.1 In this sense, whatever uncertainty we in-
troduce into our analyses by inferring rather than directly observing business
group would be balanced by new opportunities for large-scale, cross-national
research, perhaps up to the point of fitting hierarchical models of business group
effects, which have the desirable property of allowing coefficient estimates to
vary among different subpopulations (see Gelman and Hill 2006).
Assessing group- and country-level variation in firm behavior and outcomes
could illuminate previously obscure facets of financial and economic develop-
ment, especially in the realm of corporate governance. Defined variously as
“the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of
getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny 1997b, p.737) or more
broadly as “the way in which corporations are owned, controlled, and coor-
1This concern is all the more pressing given that the availability of business group data is
linked to issues of disclosure and transparency. Hence, we should expect that studies of coun-
tries with relatively high-quality institutional environments are more likely to obtain necessary
data and thus that focusing solely on these cases produces insights that might not be generaliz-
able to under-studied areas.
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dinated and set their goals” (Colli and Colpan 2016, p.275), corporate gover-
nance is intimately concerned with the competing interests of individuals with
de facto versus de jure control over organizations, and given that the analysis
of such conflict already involves firms’ relationships with external actors, there
is no reason why it could not be extended to include group-level processes. In-
deed, situating research on corporate governance with reference to the broader
social and political context has been identified as a promising area of future in-
vestigation (Morck et al. 2005; Davis 2012; Aguilera and Jackson 2010; Kogut
2012). However, in their exhaustive review of research on business groups and
corporate governance Colli and Colpan (2016, p.297) note that such work is still
“developing”, and they identify cross-national studies as a key area for future
research.
Although corporate governance’s concern with the rights of investors might
seem limiting, in fact its implications for financial and economic development
are well established. Despite the successful diffusion of market-based policies
during and after the conclusion of the Cold War (Lee and Strang 2006; Weber
et al. 2009), the wide range of outcomes experienced by countries undergoing
such reform brought attention to the quality, rather than quantity, of institu-
tional change, and the case of financial liberalization and the development of
stock markets is an especially instructive example. In assessing the economic
impact of these changes, studies at both the firm- and country-level agree that
institutional quality, not market size, was the key predictor of successful finan-
cial development (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998; Levine and Zervos
1998; Henry 2000; Hail and Leuz 2006; De la Torre et al. 2007). Hence, corpo-
rate governance research outside of the world’s most developed economies has
focused on better understanding the causes and consequences this differential
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institutional development.
In the MENA region, the growth of stock markets (Figure 2.1)has provided
an opportunity to test existing corporate governance theories in a new empirical
context while also suggesting alternative mechanisms that appear to improve
cooperation between controlling owners, managers, and minority shareholders.
Concerning the economic impact of financial liberalization, a comprehensive
study of listed firms in 11 countries in the Middle East and North Africa reports
that in their sample “liberalization has no effect on economic and investment
growth” (Naceur et al. 2008, p.673). Rather, they concur with the studies cited
above that the specific institutional environment achieved prior to liberaliza-
tion is the best predictor. Lagoarde-Segot (2013) reinforces this message in his
study of Tunisia, which appears as an example of a country not implementing
the types of institutional reforms emphasized in so much of the above work.
Other corporate governance studies in the region provide focused views of spe-
cific issues like market reactions to the 2008 financial crisis (Farooq et al. 2013)
and the Arab Spring (Hearn 2014). This latter study is especially notable as be-
ing one of the only studies of which I am aware that directly includes business
groups in a study of firms in an Arab MENA country, although there are several
studies focusing on Turkey or Israel, and Hearn et al. (2017) furthers this impor-
tant work with an analysis of IPO financing on 22 exchanges throughout Africa.
The rest of the literature focus on areas like the benefits associated with better
governance (Al-Khouri 2006; El Mehdi 2007; Omran 2009), or the predictors of
board composition (Elsayed 2010) and salary disclosure Hearn (2013).
In summary, business groups present a paradox. They are a fundamental
means of coordinating large formal organizations throughout the world, yet
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Figure 2.1: Growth of equity markets in the MENA region. Data are taken from the World Bank
Development indicators.
they operate through combinations of social relationships that not only vary
along numerous dimensions, but are also difficult to observe. This section has
argued that despite these challenges, the impact of business groups on economic
and institutional development is too powerful to ignore.
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2.3 Methods
2.3.1 Data
The data are from three primary sources. First, information on corporate net-
works comes from profiles for publicly traded firms provided by Mubasher.Info,
a investor platform based in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, that has been
used in recent studies of corporate governance in the region (Hearn 2014; Hearn
et al. 2017). From the point of view of network analyses, a crucial feature of
Mubasher.Info is that they provide the names of owners, managers, directors,
and subsidiaries in Arabic as well as Latin characters. This eliminates the diffi-
culty of matching individual and company names that have been transliterated
or translated according to different conventions, as will be described in more
detail below. Overall, I collected data on 1336 unique publicly traded firms in
the region from firm profiles constructed from 2015 annual reports. These firms
are listed on at least one of 13 exchanges in 12 countries. These are: Morocco,
Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emi-
rates with exchanges in both Abu Dhabi and Dubai, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait,
and Iraq. I supplemented this information with SIC codes from Bureau van
Dijk’s Orbis database, and data on government control from Zawya.com.
2.3.2 Matching
Access to the original Arabic spelling of individual and company names is es-
sential because corporate networks must often be inferred by matching occur-
rences of identical or very similar names is association with different firms. Both
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individual and company names, however, can easily be recorded in slightly
varying ways with abbreviations, word order, regional differences in orthogra-
phy, and simple spelling mistakes all contributing to differences that can mask
the underlying equivalence between two names. Spurious matches are another
serious problem.
To deal with the first issue, I use adaptations of the name matching algorithm
described in Colomer (2012). This procedure relies on a function that generates
a match score based on a pairwise comparisons of the words in two names. I
employ a different algorithm for individual and firm names, but both are based
on identifying specific patterns of similarity, for example abbreviations or single
character differences based on Levenshtein distance and weighting the score of
a specific form of similarity by the inverse of the frequency of each word. In
the case of firms, I compared words regardless of their position in the name,
but I maintained word order for individual names. Also, I used a weighted
combination of English or French versions of firm names and the Arabic one,
at 35% and 65%, respectively. I based person name matches on only the Arabic
version.
The key to this process was calibrating the algorithm by repeatedly assessing
its ability to distinguish between likely and spurious matches. This included
specific adjustments like ruling out matches between Muhammad and Ahmad,
which in typical Arabic spelling differ only by a single letter, and manually
coding the equivalence between appearances of names where both the given
and family name have a frequency above a certain threshold. In this case, if
I could not directly establish the connections between occurrences of a name,
for example by locating a biography describing employment with two firms, I
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defaulted to leaving them unmatched.
I verified the matches by manually checking the results for all public firms,
and all other names that were linked with a score close to the threshold.
2.3.3 Networks
Matching names across appearances in different firm profiles reveals the so-
cial structure of publicly traded firms. For example, observing that an individ-
ual who owns large blocks of several companies and serves as the chairman
in others demonstrates the influence of that particular actor, but it also signals
the relatedness of these companies since common ownership and employment
would provide an incentive and a means to cooperate. Networks, also known
as graphs, formalize this structure using two fundamental elements, nodes and
edges. A node can be any entities of interest, in this case firms and individ-
uals. Edges represent the relationships between different nodes, and different
types of relationships can be studied by constructing different networks, each
defined by a unique type of tie or ties measured in a particular time period. I
focus on two types of edges, ownership of companies by individuals and other
firms and the employee-employer relationship between directors or managers
and the firms they serve.
In the former, edges have an inherent direction and thus distinguish between
an edge representing Firm A owning part of Firm B and vice versa. They are also
weighted in the sense that we can measure an edge’s importance by the percent
of a firm held by that particular owner. In contrast, a director-firm network con-
tains uniformly weighted edges between nodes of complimentary types; there
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are no employment relationships between firms or between individuals. This
leads to a “bipartite” structure that can be analyzed in its own right or con-
densed to describe relationships between only firms or only individuals. The
latter option interprets the fact that a single person sits on the boards of two
companies as representing a connection between the two firms, for example by
communicating important information from the management of one firm to the
other. This is known as a “director-interlock” and has been a key focus of the
literature on interorganizational networks (Mizruchi 1996). These two types of
networks have formal properties that inform the community detection method
described below.
Before analyzing the graphs, I make three alterations to the raw data. First,
I delete all nodes that are not a publicly traded firm or else tied to at least two
such companies. This is to prevent the community detection algorithm from
producing a degenerate solution where most firms are simply grouped alone
with their large numbers of exclusive connections. Removing any director, man-
ager, or owner who was only tied to a single firm across both networks focuses
attention on the observed structure between public companies, which is appro-
priate given the limited information on individuals or private firms. Next, I
transform the ownership edges to make the sum of their weights on the same
scale as the number of edges in the director-interlock network and to better re-
flect the qualitative importance of different ownership levels2.Finally, I analyze
the networks one connected component at a time, which means that I assume
that groups of firms that share no connections are in separate communities and
focus on identifying clusters within each set of connected firms.
2Much of the important variation in ownership is within the range 0 − 0.2 because after this
point the control conferred by additional stock diminishes (La Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al.
2000).
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2.3.4 Community Detection
Inferring group membership from network data rests on the assumption of a
close connection between the mechanisms that form business groups and those
that generate the observed networks. Support for this assumption comes from
three sources. First, as described in Subsection 2.2.1 the definition of a busi-
ness group relies on the informal and formal ties that bind member firms into
a cohesive unit. This dovetails with basic tenets of sociological theory which
argue that ties tend to arise around important focal points (Feld 1981). Sec-
ond, empirical treatments of business groups often rely on private informa-
tion kept by regulators, field interviews, or purchasing data sets from private
firms. Studies making use of this last source often note that these providers
rely on subjective assessments of director interlocks (Fisman 2001; Khanna and
Rivkin 2001). Finally, the strongest support for this assumption comes from
Khanna and Rivkin’s (2006) analysis of the predictors of business group co-
membership in Chile. In their analysis, the authors find that the presence of
ownership and director-interlock ties between two firms are strong predictors
of co-membership, while familial connections are of lesser importance. Using
networks to study business groups is a well established practice, and both anec-
dotal reports and statistical analyses indicate that ownership and interlock net-
works contain enough information to approximate business groups as a form of
community structure.
Communities in this sense refer to clusters of nodes that exhibit more in-
ternal and fewer external ties than we would expect in a random graph with
similar properties, and the development of methods to detect these communi-
ties has grown into an important subfield of network analysis (Newman 2006;
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Fortunato 2010). In general, community detection relies on the concept of a
network clustering, which assigns each node in the network to at least one com-
munity, though most methods limit nodes to exactly one. Community detection
also requires a means of assessing the quality of a given clustering, for exam-
ple a function that measures the total intra-community connectivity relative to a
baseline that reflects the properties of the network. The most commonly studied
such quality function is called modularity. The basic form is described in Equa-
tion 2.1 where Q is the modularity value, A is an adjacency matrix such that
Ai j equals the weight of an observed edge between nodes i and j, 2m =
∑
i j Ai j,
ki =
∑
j Ai j, ci is the community assigned to node i, and δxy is the Kroneker delta,
which equals 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise.
Q =
1
2m
∑
i j
(
Ai j − kik j2m
)
δcic j (2.1)
The two inputs to the modularity function are the network in the form of the
modularity matrix A and a vector of community indices, c. The essential feature
of modularity is its choice of expected value for each edge, which is based on
the values ki and k j, which are called the degree of nodes i and j and used to
measure their connectivity in the network. Modularity then uses the expected
value for an edge between nodes i and j, which is based on their degrees and
the total number of edges in the network, as a baseline against which to as-
sess intra-community connectivity. This specification assumes that edges are
observed between nodes only based on each node’s connectivity and thus that
edge formation does not depend on other forces that encourage links between
some nodes and not others. Moreover, this assumption can be expressed differ-
ently for different types of networks. In this analysis, I adapt the multiplex mod-
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ularity function of Mucha et al. (2010) according to the specification for directed
and bipartite networks developed by (Leicht and Newman 2008) and Barber
(2007), respectively. The specification, parameterization, and derivation of the
full modularity functions used in this paper are provided in the Appendix.
In addition to being widely studied, modularity’s flexibility makes it well
suited to analyzing ownership and interlock networks. It does, however, also
present important challenges. First, modularity has an inherent “resolution
limit” that inflates the score of weakly connected clusters in large networks
(Fortunato and Barthelemy 2007). This occurs because as the number of nodes
grows, the expected value for a given edge becomes close to zero. Thus, the
modularity increase from a single edge between otherwise unconnected groups
of nodes can outweigh the penalty incurred by merging all of the other unlinked
nodes.
Accounting for the resolution limit depends on our prior expectations of
group size. On the one hand, we might expect from prior studies that the mean
number of public firms be less than ten with the common occurrence of a few
disproportionately large groups in each country (He et al. 2013). One approach
is to include a parameter γwhich increases the penalty of grouping unconnected
nodes, and it is possible to set γ to return results consistent with our prior ex-
pectations, in this case requiring value of at least 6.0. However, this approach
is limited in that it imposes a uniform increase on the penalty for including un-
connected nodes in the same community. In many cases, this fits the way data
have been generated or observed, but analyzing nested but interconnected net-
works presents a special challenge. Each public firm observation was generated
within one or more exchanges, which vary considerably in terms of the practice
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and regulation of corporate governance (Nagy Eltony and Babiker 2005). This
creates variation in the density of firm relationships that are reported in official
disclosures, so rather than assume uniformity where little exists, my approach
was to specifically incorporate this hierarchical structure by first identifying top-
level communities that roughly correspond to countries, and then to treat each
top-level community as a separate network.
In addition to the necessity of specifying community size, modularity meth-
ods also struggle with degenerate solutions and local optima (Good et al.
2010). This necessitates caution in interpreting communities based only on re-
lational information, and my solution to this challenge is the further analysis of
community-level attributes. Simultaneously analyzing both corporate networks
helps to mitigate the noise in the data by searching for areas of agreement be-
tween the two networks3, but not all areas exhibit shared patterns. Strategies
for confronting this degeneracy by looking for areas of stability or consistency
across multiple solutions have recently been proposed and represent an area for
improving the method (Lancichinetti and Fortunato 2012; Bassett et al. 2013).
More will be said on this issue below in the section on community-level at-
tributes and in the conclusion.
After specifying an appropriate modularity function, I use an adaptation of
Newman’s 2006 spectral method to repeatedly bisect the two types of networks
based on a weighted combination of their edges until doing so does not improve
the overall modularity of the network. Details are presented in the Appendix.
I chose this method due to the ease of implementation, but numerous other al-
gorithms could be used that are suited to millions of nodes and better identify
3For example, an OLS regression found that nodes sharing a direct link in one network are
on average three degrees closer in the other after controlling for node centrality.
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area of significant versus incidental clustering (Blondel et al. 2008; Lancichinetti
et al. 2011; Lancichinetti and Fortunato 2012; Bassett et al. 2013). An important
feature of the multiplex method developed by Mucha et al. (2010) is that a node
may be assigned a different community in each network. In the results pre-
sented below, 14% of nodes were place in two separate communities. I treat a
firm as belonging to a community if it is present in at least one network.
To reiterate, community detection methods can translate the information
stored in networks into an inference about business group structure. Doing
so requires tailoring both the networks and methods to enhance the visibility
and interpretation of these latent communities, but even so modularity maxi-
mization often fails to deliver an optimal or intuitive solution. Below I describe
the assessments I perform on the results of the community detection algorithm,
which hinges on using the aggregate properties of communities to tie them to
one of three organizing axes of solidarity which characterize business groups.
2.3.5 Measures of Community Attributes
The results of the community detection algorithm are thus an informed guess
about the latent forces represented by the two corporate networks. There is no
guarantee that they truly represent the global optimum. Even if they did, there
is doubt whether this optimum would correspond to an intuitive idea about
business groups. To mitigate these concerns, I attempt to establish the social rel-
evance of each community by measuring the presence of three potential sources
of solidarity: family control, government ownership, and geography in addition
to the potentially confounding influence of industry homophily.
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Recalling the definitions presented above, business groups are more than
random collections of firms cooperating on an ad hoc or transactional basis.
Rather, they are cohesive and enduring communities of organizations, and such
solidarity can in some cases be measured. I consider measure family control
by grouping individuals by shared or highly similar surnames, government by
hand-coding owners as state or non-state, and geography by accounting for the
appearance of the same individuals in records from different exchanges. These
measures are based on all individuals and firms tied to a community, including
those deleted before running the community detection algorithm.
Family measures are based on assessing the extent and exclusivity of a fam-
ily’s involvement with a particular community. It includes the following mea-
sures: the percent of firms with at least one family member as an owner, director,
or manager; mean family ownership; the family’s share of managers, chairmen,
and directors; the percent of firms in which the family collectively owns a 10%
stake4; and the average number of unique individuals associated with the major
surnames in that community. For each group, I assess family control based on
the combined scores for the top two families measured in terms of their overall
involvement. I attempt to break ties in favor or larger families. Note that these
measures cannot account for family control of private companies and are thus
likely to understate family ownership through these intermediaries.
I measure government ownership by hand-coding all owners based on their
names and web searches. This includes clear government entities like ministries
of investment or finance as well as state-owned enterprises. Just as in the case
of family ownership, I construct measures of mean government ownership and
4This cutoff represents the amount of ownership necessary for significant control over a com-
pany (La Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 2000)
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the percentage of firms in which government entities own at least 10% or 20%.
I do not attempt to code the political affiliation of individuals.
Location is another potential source of solidarity, and I develop a series of
location scores for each node based on its affiliations with companies listed on
different exchanges. Using an indirect proxy for true country of origin is not
likely to be accurate in every case, but on the whole it captures key patterns
indicating geographic diversity at the community level. For example, a director
for a single Egyptian firm would be classified as Egyptian while a director for
two Kuwaiti firms, one Egyptian firm, and an Iraqi firm would be classified as
Kuwaiti. This allows us to assign each node one or more top countries while
also measuring its geographic homogeneity.
Using these measures for each listed firm, I generate three of geographic ho-
mogeneity measures. I focus on geographic homogeneity rather than a binary
foreign-domestic variable due to the difficulty of maintaining this classification
for multi-country data. A geographically heterogeneous community is charac-
terized by ownership and control relationships that span national boundaries,
and given the otherwise strong tendency for edges to occur within close geo-
graphical proximity, this type of anomaly might indicate a strong relationship.
The first measure, top exchange score, is the percentage of firms that are listed
on the most common stock market within that community. The next measure
includes information from each firm’s activity in multiple markets and is the
mean strength of each listed firm’s affiliation with its top market, hereafter re-
ferred to as mean firm domesticity. The final statistic is the mean strength of
each listed firm’s affiliation with the the most common stock market from the
top exchange score, i.e. that group’s “home” exchange. The difference between
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these two measures is that this mean home exchange score includes the same
broader set of information as mean firm domesticity.
Finally, industry is also a likely source of inter-firm connections due to ho-
mophily, or the tendency of nodes to form ties with similar alters (McPherson
et al. 2001). I broadly assess absolute homophily at the group level as the per-
cent of public firms in the community belonging to the most common top-level
SIC code in that community. Since financial firms are over-represented on the
stock markets of the region, I also include the the relative degree of industry
concentration in the form of the euclidean distance between a vector of the per-
cent of community firms within each category and the same vector defined for
all public firms in that community’s home country.
2.3.6 Corroborating and Classifying Business Groups
The final stage in my analysis is using these measure investigate the correspon-
dence between the inferred communities and socially meaningful groups. I ex-
plore the structure of these data with a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM), which
assumes that the data were generated by a given number of distinct normal dis-
tributions and further clusters the data along the dimensions described above.
GMMs require the researcher to specify the number of underlying distributions.
I chose four, one for each category of variables. Using these clusters as a guide,
I briefly describe two examples from each category.
26
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Communities
The first step in identifying business groups from corporate networks was to si-
multaneously divide the two graphs into a relatively small number of top-level
communities. I use node location as a first guess about the broad structure of
the data and assign each node to exactly one exchange. This includes cross-
listed firms, and ties were broken randomly. Next, I employ a Kernighan-Lin
algorithm to incrementally switch the community assignments of nodes until
no modularity-increasing moves can be made (Kernighan and Lin 1970). Fig-
ure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 provide a direct visualization of the minor differences
between country of origin and top-level community. Nodes are colored by their
top exchange and refined top-level community, respectively.
These figures are based on a composite network where a single undirected
tie between two nodes indicates the presence of at least one type of connection.
Large nodes represent public firms, and all other individuals and organizations
are shown by the smaller nodes. In terms of modularity, the refined boundaries
slightly outperform the raw exchange-based communities, 0.632 to 0.630. Ta-
ble 2.1 describes some of the properties of each community in the ownership
and director-interlock networks. These 13 communities vary in the number of
unique public firms they contain across both networks, the density of connec-
tions between public firms, their modularity, and in the extent to which they are
contained within one or two exchanges.
Finally, Figure 2.4 shows same network as Figure 2.3 with nodes colored by
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Figure 2.2: A visualization of the network of publicly-traded firms in the MENA region. Nodes
are colored and shaped by inferred country of origin. Edges indicate the presence of at least one
interlock or ownership connection.
Top exchange KSE QE MSM PEX ISX BDT CSE EGX TDWL DFM ADX BB ASE
Second Exchange DFM BDT DFM CSE PEX KSE ASE CSE DFM KSE PEX
No. of unique public firms 195 43 114 42 75 58 57 195 168 40 74 35 238
No. of interlock edges 505 214 397 184 115 108 143 437 659 112 270 98 794
Mean interlock degree 2.58 4.97 3.48 4.38 1.53 1.86 2.50 2.24 3.92 2.80 3.64 2.80 3.33
No. of ownership edges 628 178 417 223 187 304 265 743 875 108 170 83 834
Mean ownership degree 3.92 4.44 4.31 6.73 3.74 6.31 5.24 4.17 5.57 3.10 2.51 2.88 4.31
Modularity 0.579 0.502 0.533 0.635 0.676 0.533 0.535 0.635 0.617 0.670 0.626 0.573 0.640
Number of lower communities 25 12 20 9 18 13 11 29 29 15 18 8 28
% of firms top exchange 0.90 0.95 0.96 0.95 1.0 0.97 1.0 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.78 0.87 0.92
Table 2.1: Network statistics of each higher-level community
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Figure 2.3: This visualization has the same layout as Figure 2.2. Nodes are colored and shaped
by location-based community. Inter-community edges have been lightened.
their lower-level community in the director-interlock network. The algorithm
identified total of 237 lower-level communities. Of these, 186 have two or more
public firms. The rest of the paper focuses on assessing the validity of these
communities.
2.4.2 Classifying Communities
Figure 2.5 shows the results of clustering each community-level data point with
more than one listed firm. The axes are defined by the mean score for stan-
dardized variables belonging to the three sources of solidarity described above.
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Figure 2.4: This visualization has the same layout as Figure 2.2. Nodes are colored and shaped
by their lower-level community assignment. Inter-community edges have been lightened.
The four clusters are shown by different colors and shapes with one along each
axis and a fourth near the origin. The GMM result classify 17 groups as family-
dominated, 26 as largely government-owned, and 37 as spanning multiple ex-
changes. The remaining 106 data points are concentrated at the far center corner
of the figure, indicating communities that lack distinctive scores in any category.
This lack of corroboration stems from at least three sources. First, it is possible
that the community does in fact correspond to a business group, but that it
relies on an unobserved form of solidarity. Second, the algorithm may have in-
correctly identified the boundaries of a group, preventing the full observation
of family or political ties. This could be the result of incorrect data or one of the
many degeneracies to which the modularity function is vulnerable. Finally, the
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Figure 2.5: A three-dimensional scatter plot showing the results of the GMM clustering algo-
rithm. The x, y, and z axes are based on the average z-score of the community measures in each
category. Family groups are the red circles, government groups are shown as blue diamonds,
transnational groups are yellow triangles, and the remaining communities are shown as green
squares.
most common cause is likely that many firms are simply not members of any
group.
Figure 2.6 provides a more detailed assessment of this pattern. Here, each
community is represented as a dot overlain on box plots that describe the distri-
bution of a variable within each group. Category 1 includes family-dominated
groups, which are especially strongly distinguished by their elevated level of
family ownership, 2 represents uncorroborated communities with low scores
across all three dimensions and as well as slightly less geographic homogeneity,
and groups in the third category are distinguished by violating the general ten-
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Figure 2.6
dency toward geographic homogeneity within inferred communities, perhaps
indicating a group of firms operating in different markets but bound by a com-
mon origin . Finally, the fourth type corresponds to government-owned groups
and is characterized by high government ownership.
2.5 Examples
The correspondence between the results of the GMM analysis and the three ob-
served axes of solidarity helps to establish the relevance of the community-level
measures. Without observed group labels, however, it is not possible to estab-
lish its overall accuracy. Instead, this section presents two examples from each
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category that show some of the important patterns in the data. The visualiza-
tions accompanying each example show all nodes within a community as well
as adjacent external nodes. Intra-community edges are darkened.
Beginning with family firms, Figure 2.7 shows the Jordanian Abo Khadiga
business group. All seven firms in this community have at least one of ten fam-
ily members as an owner or director, and the family owns on average 15.9% of
each company. This results in an aggregate of family score of 1.8 standard devi-
ations above the mean for all communities. However, the results are not always
so clear, and countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar present a special challenge
for the method due to the extraordinary influence of a small number of fami-
lies. Figure 2.8 shows a community of Saudi firms that feature eight individuals
from the al-Subaie and al-Serafi families, but this high number of individuals
and overall participation is offset by a relatively low level of ownership yield-
ing an aggregate family z-score of 0.85. Furthermore, members of the al-Subaie
family also appear in other groups, as can be seen in the three interconnected
green-colored nodes.
Moving on to communities of government-owned firms, Figure 2.9 shows
group of seven publicly traded Omani firms with strong signs of government
control. State organizations, such as the Ministry of Finance and the Civil Ser-
vice Employees Pension Fund, own 37.2% of the entire group, yielding an aggre-
gate government z-score of 2.1 after taking into account variation across com-
panies. Other communities reflect more ambiguous situations. In the case of
the group of four UAE companies shown in Figure 2.10, a relatively low level of
overall ownership of 15.6% is offset by the fact that the two banks in the group
are closely tied to the Emir of Sharjah, Mohamed Al-Qassemi, although this is
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Figure 2.7: The Jordanian Abo Khadiga business group. Note the density of internal ties.
not reflected in a lower government score of 0.88.
Many communities of government-owned firms also have a transnational
character. Though assigned to the cluster of the transnational communities by
the GMM, the group shown in Figure 2.11, is largely owned—along with sev-
eral other firms visible in the picture—by the Bahraini Social Insurance Organi-
zation, yielding a government z-score of 2.4. Its high geographic heterogeneity
z-score of 2.1 stems from the subsidiary telecommunications company listed
on the Saudi Exchange. Figure 2.12 provides an example of a group of mainly
Kuwaiti firms that are transnational based on their extensive investments in
other countries, yielding an aggregate z-score of 2.0.
Rather than containing industry-based groups, the final cluster is composed
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Figure 2.8: A set of Saudi firms with strong involvement by the al-Subaie and al-Serafi families.
Note the interconnected group of green firms adjacent to this community, which also feature
heavy involvement by the al-Subaie family.
mostly of communities with low scores across all four categories, but there are
exceptions. Figure 2.13, for example, shows a dense group of Palestinian firms
connected with the al-Masri family with each firm associated with at least one
of seven different individuals, yielding an overall ownership of 10% and an
aggregate family z-score of 1.1. The group of four Tunisian firms in Figure 2.14
is in a similar situation with regard to government ownership with a z-score of
1.4.
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Figure 2.9: A group of Omani firms with high-government ownership.
2.6 Discussion
The results in this paper rely on publicly available information on corporate
networks to make inferences about business group structures, which are oth-
erwise difficult to observe. The above analysis of community properties and
brief examples show that the community detection algorithm does succeed in
identifying sets of firms that meet a broad definition of business groups. More
specifically, by measuring the aggregate properties of inferred communities we
can identify socially meaningful groups.
Nevertheless, there is room for improvement. In order to provide accurate
information on the relative prevalence of business groups it is necessary to bet-
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Figure 2.10: An Emirati business group with close ties to the Emirate of Sharjah, one of the
constituent states of the federal UAE.
ter distinguish member and non-member firms. This is frustrated by the fact
that in the current method the combination of limited data and degenerate re-
sults of the modularity algorithm might prevent the identification of all groups.
Moreover, there are many other possible sources of solidarity, which might dis-
tinguish further communities if they were observed. For example, membership
in a religious or ethnic minority could provide also strong basis for cohesion.
Two general strategies could mitigate these concerns. First, incorporating
more data could improve the accuracy of the algorithm while also giving a bet-
ter window into the social relevance of each group. This paper uses information
on location, family, and government affiliation as means of checking the validity
of patterns derived from ownership and director-interlock networks. However,
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Figure 2.11: A group owned by the Bahrani government with a Saudi subsidiary.
these concepts can also be represented as bipartite networks where the owner
and director nodes are linked by common affiliation with a government, sur-
name, or country. Hence, they could be incorporated into the multiplex algo-
rithm in order to model our knowledge of these structures. Furthermore, it is
also possible to construct a third corporate network using data on stock price
comovement, and Khanna and Thomas (2009) have shown that belonging to
the same group is a significant predictor of price correlation, even when also ac-
counting for direct ownership and director-interlock relations. Thus, a further
means of confirming the salience of a set of communities is to test their ability
to predict similarly priced firms. This weighted undirected network could also
serve as an input for the community detection algorithm. This analysis is the
subject of the second chapter of this dissertation.
38
Figure 2.12: A dense core of Kuwaiti firms surrounded by geographically diverse affiliates.
2.7 Conclusion
Business groups are sets of firms bound by an intermediate level of formal and
informal connections that coordinate their actions by means of several forms
of intra-group solidarity. Using this definition as a guide, this paper has em-
ployed a community detection algorithm and a Gaussian Mixture Model to
learn about the latent structures in the network of corporate ownership and
director-interlock networks in the Middle East and North Africa. The results
show that using a multiplex modularity-based algorithm developed by Mucha
et al. (2010), it is possible to identify 50-75 sets of firms with strong family, gov-
ernment, or transnational ties.
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Figure 2.13: The Palestinian al-Masri business group.
The implications of this work are twofold. First, most studies of business
groups have been conducted in a small number of countries. Using network
analysis to infer these groups reduces the need for extensive field work or to
pay for expensive supplementary data. Especially after implementing the re-
finements discussed in the previous section, using community information as
a proxy for directly observed business groups would allow for analyses across
a wider range of times and locations. Second, the potential for using computa-
tional methods to increase transparency extends beyond business groups, and
as such this paper contributes to emerging work on using machine learning and
other methods to uncover consequential economic, political, and social struc-
tures (Hicks et al. 2015).
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Figure 2.14: A group of Tunisian firms with significant state ownership.
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CHAPTER 3
PRICE SYNCHRONICITY, INTER-FIRM NETWORKS, AND BUSINESS
GROUPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
3.1 Introduction
Business Groups are a fundamental part of the social organization of economic
activity throughout the world (Khanna and Yafeh 2007; Granovetter 2010; Col-
pan et al. 2010; Carney et al. 2011; Colli and Colpan 2016). Despite the prolif-
eration of research on business groups, few studies have investigated their role
in regions like the Middle East and North Africa. Lack of available data is one
potential reason for this neglect, and I am not aware of any public data on group
membership for Arab countries in the region1, and in previous work I show how
community detection techniques can be used to infer business group member-
ship (Siemon 2017). This paper extends that approach and further verifies its
results by providing evidence that these latent groups influence the comove-
ment of stock prices among public firms in the Middle East and North Africa.
Studying the price mechanism in developing stock exchanges is essential
because financial markets are useful only insofar as they improve the match-
ing of investment opportunities with the capital required for their realization.
Economic theory suggests that in equity markets, which provide a forum for
the buying and selling of ownership stakes in large corporations, the price of
a firm’s shares should reflect market participants’ expectations about the value
of the future cash-flow to which the ownership entitles them (Wurgler 2000).
1Many authors of business group studies in other countries note the extensive field work
necessary to gather their data. Some countries, however, benefit from well publicized data sets
that may either be purchased or obtained from government agencies.
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While country- and industry-specific environments certainly inform these ex-
pectations, studies have found that these factors are overrepresented in firm
prices beyond what might be expected from their influence on other measures
of performance (Pindyck and Rotemberg 1993). In other words, stock prices are
often synchronous in that a large part of variation over time can be explained
by the overall movement of an entire exchange or within a particular industry
(Roll 1988; Morck et al. 2000). Taken at face value, such comovement implies
that investors have limited access to firm-specific information and thus rely on
broader knowledge of a firm’s environment when deciding whether to buy or
sell a stock at a given price.
Studies of synchronicity in financial markets typically focus on the comove-
ment of individual firms with a relevant exchange or industry index. This
generates an informative measure of the sensitivity of each firm’s price to its
aggregate environment but necessarily ignores other factors that might make
some firms more synchronous with one another. For example, numerous stud-
ies have found that political connections are related to distinctive price move-
ments in response to politically charged events (Fisman 2001; Faccio 2006; Leuz
and Oberholzer-Gee 2006; Chekir and Diwan 2014). Rather than studying syn-
chronicity at the firm- or exchange-level, this paper adopts the approach of
Khanna and Thomas (2009), who disaggregated synchronicity into an analysis
of pairwise correlations in the returns of listed firms in Chile, in order to study
the value relevance of inter-firm relationships and business groups in thirteen
exchanges in the Middle East and North Africa.
By combining price data with directly observed and inferred measures of
ties among listed firms in the region, this study provides further evidence on the
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link between inter-firm networks and price similarity. In doing so, it also con-
firms the validity of using community detection methods from network analy-
sis to identify meaningful business groups by comparing the inferred clusters
with an independently generated but related data set. Furthermore, it uses a
Bayesian multilevel modeling framework to assess how the strength of this as-
sociation varies between exchanges by measuring the substantive importance
of family business group ties and government ownership in determining firm
value in different contexts. Finally, although the number of exchanges in the
region limits the strength of country-level inferences, it is also useful to inspect
the relationships among this type of variation and important exchange-level
measures, and the analysis concludes by presenting evidence on the relation-
ship between estimated coefficients and liquidity, regulatory quality, and other
variables.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature
and presents three hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 describes
the model and methodology. Section 5 presents results, and Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses
The goal of this paper is to provide evidence pertaining to interdependence
among stock-price comovement, inter-firm relationships, and business groups.
This section describes the relevant literature on these topics and establishes
the rationale for three hypotheses relating to price synchronicity and business
groups. As noted in the introduction, I do not observe business groups directly
but instead infer them from clusters of observed network ties. This section fo-
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cuses only on the relation between synchronicity and inter-firm relationships. A
discussion of the literature linking network clusters to business groups is pre-
sented in Chapter 2.
3.2.1 Synchronicity, R2, and Firm-Specific Information
Neoliberal reforms in the Middle East and North Africa have been justified by
the ability of market-mechanisms to reduce the inefficiencies that arise from
politically motivated economic decisions, and no mechanism is more central to
market-based systems than price. In the case of equity markets, determining the
value of a given company is complex but at a fundamental level is shaped by
market participants’ expectations about the future profits of the firm to which
the owners will have a claim (Fama and Jensen 1985). This expectation in turn
depends on information relevant to the firm’s future performance, as well as
investors’ ability to collect their due profits, and the efficiency of financial mar-
kets is correlated with both of these factors (Wurgler 2000; Durnev et al. 2004).
In other words, investors with better information are able to make better deci-
sions about where to invest and will do so more freely when they feel confident
about receiving a return.
Directly measuring the quality of information, however, is often impractical,
and the synchronicity literature instead approaches the issue by decomposing
the temporal variation in stock prices into market-, industry-, and firm-specific
components (Roll 1988). This is achieved by first estimating a linear regression
for each firm where the dependent variable is the firm’s change in price during
a given time period. The predictors are an intercept and the average change in
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price of one or more indices of stocks listed on the same exchange or operating
the the same industry. The proportion of explained variance, or R2, under these
simple models is then taken as a measure of synchronicity, or the dependence
of that firm’s price on the price of other firms. The variance of the residual is
interpreted as the firm-specific idiosyncrasy.
The accumulation of results linking R2 synchronicity to theoretically impor-
tant phenomena has supported its widespread adoption. For example, Wurgler
(2000) and Morck et al. (2000) provide evidence of its association with efficient
capital allocation and protections for minority shareholders, respectively. Spe-
cific evidence linking R2 to the frequency of informative events has been pro-
vided by Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), Chan and Hameed (2006), and An
and Zhang (2013), and these studies suggest that trades by firm insiders and
dedicated, long-term institutional investors have the expected effect of increas-
ing the firm-specific variance, while greater analyst coverage increases the de-
pendence on industry or market trends. This latter result reflects the fact that
analysts tend to specialize in a particular area and hence have a comparative ad-
vantage in assessing the implications of industry-wide events. A complemen-
tary set of analyses investigate the role transparency and financial disclosures
and again find the expected relationship; countries and firms with more opaque
reporting practices tend to have greater price synchronicity (Jin and Myers 2006;
Haggard et al. 2008; Hutton et al. 2009).
Even with these results, synchronicity remains an indirect proxy for firm-
specific information, and it is not always clear to what extent firm-specific vari-
ation reflects meaningful information rather than uninformative noise (De Long
et al. 1990; Shleifer and Vishny 1997a). Although Durnev et al. (2003) address
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this issue with data on US firms, by demonstrating an association between low
synchronicity and the ability of current returns to predict future earnings, other
countries might have extremely poor information environments characterized
by both low synchronicity and a weak connection between firm fundamentals
and share prices. Nevertheless, the important point for this paper is that both
firms and exchanges vary substantially in the types of information reflected by
their stock prices, and that this variation can be observed by analyzing the in-
terdependence between different time-series of returns. For example, Figure 3.1
shows the stock prices of all Saudi and Jordanian firms as a percent of their
mean value during the 2015 calendar year. The Jordanian firms have little com-
mon pattern besides a slight decrease, but the Saudi exchanges shows a strong
tendency for prices to move in unison. The corresponding R2 values for this
time period are 0.41 for Saudi Arabia and 0.05 for Jordan2.
3.2.2 Inter-firm Relationships and the Price Mechanism
This study differs from the firm- and country-level studies noted above in that
it focuses on synchronicity between pairs of companies, as opposed to comove-
ment between one firm and the rest of the market. As such, this section turns
to the literature on firm relationships and stock-prices in order to motivate hy-
potheses about synchronicity within business groups, which for the purposes
of this study are defined as collections of firms which share a variety for formal
and informal connections reinforced by an underlying source of solidarity (Gra-
2The R2 values were calculated following Morck et al. (2000) by regressing the daily percent
change for each firm on the market by the mean percent change for all firms on that market
and then calculating the average of all firm-specific R2 values weighted by the variance in their
returns. Because some exchanges in the region are dominated by a small number of highly
valued equities, I do not weight the mean market return by firm value.
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Figure 3.1: Prices of Saudi and Jordanian firms in 2015 plotted relative to each firm’s mean price
for the entire year.
novetter 2010). See Chapter 2 for a more complete discussion of this definition.
The idea that firms within the same business group should have correlated
returns is based on a variety of empirical evidence. As case studies of Korean
chaebol and Japanese keiretsu demonstrate, business groups can be more or less
centralized, but either case entails coordination of important firm decisions at
the group level (Lincoln et al. 1992; Hamilton and Biggart 1988). This type of
shared control is also associated with the pooling of resources (Guillen 2000).
Although business groups do not appear to have a universally positive or neg-
ative effect on firm performance (Khanna and Yafeh 2007), mechanisms like in-
ternal credit markets have been shown to reduce the variance of firm outcomes
both cross-sectionally and over time (Lincoln et al. 1996; Almeida et al. 2015). A
direct test of the influence of group comembership on pairwise synchronicity is
provided by Khanna and Thomas (2009) in their study of of inter-firm relation-
ships in Chile. In their sample of 187 listed firms from 1996, they find that group
comembership is associated with an increase of between 0.057 and 0.094 in the
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correlation of returns, depending on the other variables included in the model.
Motivation for linking business groups and price similarity also comes from
the literatures on corporate governance and the economic value of political re-
lationships. Interest in business groups was at least partly motivated by the
extraordinary success of East Asian economies during the 1980s, but the 1998
Asian financial crisis helped to focus attention on the costs as well as the bene-
fits of these types of economic arrangements (Rajan and Zingales 1998). Strong
informal networks can facilitate trust, flexibility, and the sharing of resources,
but at the same time can carry connotations of corruption, obligation, and opac-
ity (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1997; Dieleman and Sachs 2008). In terms of stock
prices, reliance on informal relations is in conflict with the logic of a public mar-
ket for company ownership, since only a small subset of potential investors are
likely to participate in these networks.
The corporate governance literature’s concern with conflicts between the de
facto and de jure control of organizations is directly relevant to this problem. In
the US context, Ferreira and Laux (2007) find that firms with fewer protections
against takeover bids by outside investors are less synchronous. The threat of
a hostile takeover, however, is not a concern for most listed companies in the
world, and studies of corporate governance in emerging markets tend to in-
stead focus on potential conflicts between controlling and minority sharehold-
ers (La Porta et al. 2008). One source of this friction are so-called ownership
“pyramids”, which amplify an ultimate owner’s control over firms at the bot-
tom of an ownership chain by exploiting the fact that effective control can be
achieved with substantially less than a full majority of shares. In their study
of French listed firms, Boubaker et al. (2014) use this disparity as a measure of
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the divergence between majority and minority shareholder interests and show
that it is associated with less firm-specific stock-price variation. Gul et al. (2010)
report a similar finding for China, where they identify a quadratic association
between ownership concentration and synchronicity and whereby the positive
association between the largest owner’s share and synchronicity begins to de-
crease once that share passes around 50%. These two studies reinforce the idea
that if a top shareholder’s effective control is proportional to the share of the
firm’s profits to which their ownership entitles them, they are less likely to hide
earnings and “tunnel” profits toward firms where they have greater direct own-
ership using various forms of self-dealing (Bertrand et al. 2002; Bae et al. 2002).
In short, price correlations between firms in the same group should reflect
the effects of coordination and resource sharing as well as their common expo-
sure to governance issues. The latter point is especially important because there
is reason to doubt the link between firm value and underlying fundamentals for
business group members (Bae and Jeong 2007). Thus, even if the quality of the
information disclosure for a particular firm or market is weak, the share prices
for members of the same group might be correlated due to the influence of a
shared distortion.
The prices of firms and business groups with political ties have also been
found to move together in response to exogenous political events (Fisman 2001;
Chekir and Diwan 2014). Similar studies have demonstrated how connections
to government elites lower firms’ costs of capital and note that such benefits
do not outlast transitions to new parties or regimes (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee
2006; Johnson and Mitton 2003; Fan et al. 2014). These studies typically measure
political ties by obtaining observations of informal ties or by coding the political
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affiliations of board members and managers.
3.2.3 Stock Markets in the Middle East and North Africa
The Middle East and North Africa are an attractive area for studying the as-
sociations between networks, business groups, and stock prices for three in-
terrelated reasons: the prevalence of informal networks linking the state and
the economy, the recent widespread reforms of equity markets, and the largely
unexplored role of business groups in both these phenomena. The instability
that has long plagued the region cannot be separated from a crisis of high pop-
ulation growth and low job creation, and studies have repeatedly blamed the
abuses of a privileged minority of political and economic elites for this poor
economic performance (Heydemann 2004; Benhassine et al. 2009). These allu-
sions to endemic corruption in the region have tended to take the form of nar-
ratives that link government policy with the interests of their alleged cronies,
but recent work by Diwan et al. (2016) has added to this literature by providing
clear quantitative evidence that the Egyptian industries that experienced the en-
trance of politically connected businesses in the 2000s had lower employment
growth relative to what would be expected in comparison to other sectors in the
Egyptian economy and the same sectors in other countries.
Such evidence again highlights the potential social cost of economic systems
that rely on informal relationships. Generalizing this finding to other coun-
tries in the region, however, is not easy. While institutions based on informal
relationships will tend to exacerbate inequalities between connected and un-
connected individuals, they nevertheless have the potential to serve as robust
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sources of trust and support in otherwise difficult institutional environments
(Nee and Opper 2012). Indeed, the diversity of findings on the social desir-
ability of business groups supports the idea that the balance between these two
forces is complex and not well understood (Khanna and Yafeh 2007). Thus,
the negative impact of cronyism in Egypt might not apply to the experience of
other countries in the region, and better understanding of the causes of eco-
nomic stagnation in the the Middle East and North Africa will require more
empirical work to establish under what conditions informal relations between
states and businesses do more harm than good.
Unfortunately, replicating studies like Diwan et al. (2016) requires informa-
tion that is difficult to obtain. The authors first interviewed business elites about
the incidence of businessmen with perceived political ties and then compared
these connections against their knowledge of the effective structures of political
power in Egypt, in order to eliminate ties with no real influence on government
policy. Access to both types of information can of course be limited, especially
in politically volatile countries with poor transparency, but the revitalization of
equity markets in the Middle East allows for a less direct approach using only
publicly-available data. The growth and reform of these markets has improved
the disclosure of information about the ownership, governance, financial per-
formance, and value for a greater number of listed firms, and the availability
of these data has encouraged a growing literature on the relationships between
firm governance, economic performance, and firm value in the region.
This work can be divided into three categories based on the outcome of in-
terest. The first examines the predictors of specific firm governance policies,
and the most relevant of these for the present study focus on the quality of in-
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formation disclosures, as measured by composite indices created by analyzing
the contents of annual reports. In the case of the Jordanian stock market, Had-
dad et al. (2015) find that in their sample of 57 annual reports from non-financial
firms, companies with more concentrated government ownership have higher
disclosure scores, while those with greater family ownership have lower scores.
A similar study of 2007-2011 annual reports from 667 listed financial firms in
the Gulf Cooperation Council countries3, however, finds that firms with board
members affiliated from ruling families of the respective country have lower
scores across three separate disclosure metrics (Al-Hadi et al. 2016). These con-
trasting results again highlight the difficulty of assessing implications of gov-
ernment ties.
The second category of studies involving listed firms in the region concerns
the impact of firm and country characteristics on the behavior of the markets
themselves. Beginning again with studies of the information content of stock
prices, Abu-Ghunmi et al. (2015) analyze a sample of 116 non-financial firms in
Jordan from 2000 to 2010 and find that firms with higher ownership concentra-
tion have less firm-specific volatility, which agrees with the results of Boubaker
et al. (2014) and Gul et al. (2010). In the case of Tunisia, however, Galanti et al.
(2017) find that analyst recommendations are only weakly predictive of firm
value relative to similar studies in other countries, suggesting that prices reflect
noise or private information, perhaps as a result of low levels of informed trad-
ing. Indeed, the informativeness of a firm’s stock price is intrinsically related
to the frequency of trades since each transaction incorporates new data about
market participants’ expectations. Hearn (2014) approaches this issue of liquid-
ity using a sample of over 300 firms on the Moroccan, Tunisian, and Egyptian
3Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Oman
53
stock markets in order to analyze the association of firm- and country-level mea-
sures with the average transaction costs of trading a firm’s shares both before
and after the regime changes in early 2011. His results support the use of the
percent of days with non-zero returns as a proxy for liquidity and also suggest
that firms affiliated with family business groups have marginally lower trans-
action costs in Morocco, Tunisia, and among larger Egyptian firms.
Finally, another set of studies focuses on the associations between different
governance structures and directly observed measures of firm performance in
addition to market value. For example, Uddin et al. (2014) find evidence that
government-owned firms in the UAE have a higher return on assets but lower
valuations relative to their total assets. In Oman, Rajab et al. (2015) investigate
how a composite measure of the quality of governance by a firm’s board of di-
rectors predicts the interest the firm pays on its debt, and find that creditors
appear to be less willing to offer cheaper loans in response to improved gover-
nance in family-dominated firms. An alternative perspective on family gover-
nance is given by Mnasri and Ellouze (2015), who find that family-dominated
firms in Tunisia are more productive, but only in less-competitive sectors of the
economy.
Taken together, these studies are suggestive of the underlying complexities
of corporate governance, family business groups, and government connections
in the diverse political economies of the Middle East and North Africa. There is
evidence that governance issues can manifest in a variety of contexts across the
region, but studies that rely only on formally disclosed information inevitably
suffer from the selectivity of these data in terms of both the firms that dis-
close and the measures that are available. In order to generate causal evidence
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about the costs and benefits of informal economic relationships, more informa-
tion is required that speaks directly to the mechanisms involved. For example,
Chekir and Diwan (2014) supplement stock price and other publicly available
data for Egyptian listed firms with “common knowledge” from stock brokers
about which firms have received special assistance from the state. They use this
extra information to show that these politically connected firms suffered dispro-
portionate decreases in value due to political events like the 2011, uprising and
furthermore that this value is linked to greater access to state-subsidized credit
but not better utilization of the extra capital.
Nevertheless, even formalizing common knowledge can be challenging, and
this study instead seeks to make fuller use of the data contained in common dis-
closures by converting them into a network, which is a formal representation of
the connections between individuals and organizations. This approach has a
long history in sociology and organizational studies (Mizruchi 1996), and the
key innovation of this study is the use of community detection algorithms to
search for socially meaningful clusters within these networks (Newman 2006;
Mucha et al. 2010). As described in Chapter 2, there is evidence that an identifi-
able subset of these network communities can serve as proxies for the business
group memberships of listed firms. Although the amount of research on busi-
ness groups in the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa is small
compared to other areas of the world, they have been identified in published
studies of Morocco (Saadi 1989) as well as Tunisia and Egypt (Hearn 2014), and
research on the impact of informal connections in economic governance would
not be complete without accounting for the role of these ubiquitous and diverse
institutions (Granovetter 2010). As such, two of the goals of this study are to
use pairwise price synchronicity to provide evidence on how the importance of
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inter-firm relationships varies across the Middle East and North Africa and to
confirm the validity of inferred business group measures.
The basic requirement for this approach to be successful is that stock prices
in the region reflect enough firm-specific information for the influence of inter-
firm relationships to be observable. Although I am not aware of other studies
of pairwise comovement in the MENA region, two of the studies mentioned
above provide evidence that firm prices do respond to important firm-specific
information. In addition to demonstrating the value of political connections in
Egypt, Chekir and Diwan (2014) also provide direct evidence that investors in
the Egyptian market are both aware of the connections enjoyed by listed firms
and that relationships with the state induce synchronicity through shared vul-
nerability to political instability. The results of Abu-Ghunmi et al. (2015) are
also encouraging in that they show the same decrease in firm-specific informa-
tion with greater ownership concentration that has been found in countries with
large and active markets like France and China (Boubaker et al. 2014; Gul et al.
2010). Less-direct evidence is available from a wider literature on the extent
to which accounting-based measures of firm value predict the market price. In
general, this literature finds that measures of firm earnings and book-value are
moderately predictive of share prices in Kuwait (El Shamy and Kayed 2005; Al-
Hares et al. 2012), Saudi Arabia (Al-Sehali and Spear 2004), Jordan (Abuzayed
et al. 2009), Egypt (Ragab and Omran 2006; El-Sayed Ebaid 2011), and Morocco
and Tunisia (Anandarajan and Hasan 2010). Because they rely on annual re-
ports for their measures of earnings and book-value, they can only give a coarse
indication of the relationship between firm-specific information and price. Nev-
ertheless, the fact that earnings and book-value show a consistent relationship
to annual variations in price is evidence that prices in the region do depend at
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least somewhat on firm-specific information.
In conclusion, this paper tests both the value-relevance of inter-firm rela-
tionship in the Middle East and North Africa as well as the ability of the com-
munity detection algorithm from Chapter 2 to identify meaningful business
groups through the following hypotheses. First, given the results of Khanna
and Thomas (2009) I expect to observe greater price comovement between firms
who share a directly observable relationship.
Hypothesis 1: Firms that share a director or owner have greater pairwise synchronic-
ity.
Finding support for this hypothesis would help to confirm the results of
Khanna and Thomas (2009) for a wider sample of countries. Second, given the
continuing economic influence of the state in the Middle East and North Africa,
government ownership should be especially important in shaping the valuation
of firms.
Hypothesis 2: Firms that are owned by parts of the same national government have
greater pairwise synchronicity beyond that associated with shared owners in general.
Government ownership is of course not equivalent to the types of crony
connections found in Chekir and Diwan (2014) and Diwan et al. (2016), but it
still reflects direct state involvement. Third, compared with government own-
ership, business group membership is more difficult to observe. My approach
combines the network communities with information about the surnames of
owners, chairmen, and top management as follows.
Hypothesis 3: Firms that are members of the same inferred network community and
both have at least one owner, chairman, or top manager from that community’s domi-
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nant family have greater pairwise sychronicity than that associated with their directly
observed shared director and ownership ties.
Finally, the diversity of the political and economic environments in the re-
gion suggests that these hypotheses might apply more or less strongly for firms
on different exchanges. Given the small sample of exchanges in the data, I do
not offer a formal hypothesis concerning the sources of this variation.
3.3 Data
This study investigates the association between inter-firm relationships and
price synchronicity using data from 1373 publicly traded firms on 13 stock ex-
changes in 12 countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Of these firms,
1110 have sufficient non-missing data. The units of analysis are all pairs of
firms listed on the same exchange. Including cross-listings, this yields a total
of 71, 677 observations.
3.3.1 Price Similarity
Pairwise price correlations are based Datastream’s record of each firm’s ad-
justed daily closing price in the local currency from January 1, 2010 through
December 31, 2016. I chose this wide period because the low liquidity of many
firms in the region often makes it impractical to estimate a correlation parameter
for every pair of observations from a single year4. I calculated each firm’s daily
4For each exchange with N publicly traded firms, this involves N(N − 1)/2 parameters. Many
firms in the region have fewer non-zero returns in a year than there are other firms on their
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Figure 3.2: The number of days with non-zero returns for each firm plotted against its mean
price correlation with other firms on the same exchange. Note the extreme mean values for firms
with fewer than 100 days of non-zero returns. Different exchanges are indicated by shapes to
distinguish the influence of small sample size and high exchange-level synchronicity.
percent return as rit = (Pit − Pit−1)/Pit−1 where rit is the return for firm i on day t
and Pit and Pit−1 are the adjusted closing prices for day t and the previous trad-
ing day, respectively. As Morck et al. (2000) note, although Datastream claims
these prices are adjusted for events that yield abnormally large shifts in price,
numerous changes of over 100% of a firm’s value were observed, and I follow
their procedure by recoding these days as missing.
A more serious issue with these data is the sparsity of non-zero returns over
the seven-year period. In order to minimize the noise from infrequently traded
stocks, I followed Khanna and Thomas (2009) and calculated the correlation in
returns for all pairs of firms within each exchange using only those days for
which both had a non-zero value. I use only firms with at least 100 non-zero
returns. This accords with the finding that non-zero returns are a convenient
exchange, and estimating N − 1 parameters from fewer than N observations will necessarily
produce noisy estimates.
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proxy for liquidity in the region (Hearn 2014). I chose the cutoff of 100 by in-
specting the average correlation of each firm relative to its mean correlation with
other firms in the exchange, and then selecting a value that would exclude all
firms with abnormally high or low values5. Figure 3.2 shows a plot of these
values with firms on different exchanges represented by different shapes.
I removed the constraint that correlation values must fall within the inter-
val [−1, 1] using a Fisher transformation. This has little effect on values with
an absolute value of less than 0.5, but increases the absolute value of correla-
tions more as they get closer to −1 or 1, which have infinite values under the
transformation6. The resulting data have a higher proportion of extreme values
than would be expected from a normal distribution. Figure 3.3 demonstrates
this behavior for an extreme and a moderate case. These quantile-quantile plots
compare the Jordanian and Saudi price correlation values to a normal distribu-
tion. In the Jordanian data, the values at bottom-left and top-right curve away
from the fitted line, indicating that the quantile values corresponding to those
points are lower and higher, respectively, than would be expected if the data
were normally distributed. The Saudi data are closer to the fitted line and show
a less pronounced but similar pattern.
5An alternative approach is to weight each dyadic observation by the number of non-zero
returns common to the two firms. Doing so, however, introduces the further problem of spec-
ifying the correct weighting scheme. For example, while a correlation measure based on 10
observations is obviously much less reliable than one based on 110, it is less clear how much
preference to show between 300 and 400 or 1000 and 1500.
6There are no instances in these data of firms with perfect correlations of −1 or 1.
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Figure 3.3: Quantile-quantile plots for Jordan and Saudi Arabia demonstrate the high proportion
of extreme values in the data relative to a normal distribution.
3.3.2 Observed Network Ties
The measures of inter-firm relationships are based on lists of the directors, man-
agers, and owners of each firm in 20157. These data were taken from firm pro-
files on mubasher.com, which has been used as a source in other studies of pub-
lic firms in the region (e.g. Hearn 2014). Individual names appear in Arabic and
as transliterations into Latin characters, and company names are similarly avail-
able in Arabic and as either English or French translations. In order to construct
measures of inter-firm relationships, names were cleaned and matched across
occurrences in different firm profiles using an adaptation of the algorithm de-
scribed in Colomer (2012). In general, I gave more weight to Arabic company
names and ignored transliterated individual names unless no Arabic name was
available. The core of the matching algorithm assigns scores to different types
of similarity between two words and aggregates these values across all words in
7The analysis thus compares observations from a single year to correlations based on a seven-
year window, though I believe this is justified not only because of the need for more non-zero
return observations but also because the ties under consideration are relatively stable over time.
61
a name. Names with a score above a threshold are considered a match. Chapter
2 provides full details on this procedure.
Next, I used the matched names to construct four types of networks, which
are defined as a set of vertices linked by edges. The two principle graphs are a
bipartite network of director-firm affiliations and a directed network of owner-
ship relationships. The former is bipartite in that it involves two distinct types
of vertices, firms and directors, linked by edges representing an employment
relationship, which can only exist between nodes of different types, i.e. a firm
cannot serve as a director for another firm. The ownership network is directed
in order to reflect the inherent asymmetry of ownership relations and allow for
mutual cross-holdings, such that Firm A owning shares in Firm B is distinct
from an edge in the opposite direction. These networks provide the follow-
ing basic measures of the relatedness of two given firms: director-interlocks,
which is a binary measure of whether two firms share at least one director; di-
rect ownership; and shared ownership, defined as the geometric mean of the
total percent of shares held in each firm by all shared owners.
I supplemented these direct representations of ownership control relation-
ships with information on the surnames of individuals and the government
ownership of non-publicly traded firms, creating two additional bipartite net-
works representing possible family and government ties, respectively. The
first is composed of surnames linked to company or individual names where
they appear. The second includes non-public firms, which were hand-coded as
state-owned and linked to a rough proxy for their government. I coded firms
based on their names, as well as through online information on zawya.com and
bloomberg.com. I created one government node for each exchange and linked
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owners to the government where they owned the greatest number of firms8.
3.3.3 Community Detection
Despite the variety of relational data encoded by these networks, their substan-
tive implications are not always clear. Director-interlocks can occur for a variety
of reasons and do not necessarily indicate a meaningful economic relationship
between two firms (Palmer 1983; Mizruchi 1996; Haunschild and Beckman 1998;
Chu and Davis 2016). A shared surname, moreover, is neither a necessary nor
sufficient indicator of family ties (Khanna and Rivkin 2006). Even government
ownership can have an ambiguous relationship with state control because of
the widespread involvement of state pension and social security funds in the
region’s stock markets (Heydemann 2004). In order to better identify meaning-
ful connections between firms, I use a multiplex community detection algorithm
to identify clusters of firms that appear across one or more of the four networks
(Mucha et al. 2010). This procedure relies on a generalization of network modu-
larity, which is a clustering score indicating the extent to which a specified set of
nodes are more interconnected than would be expected under a null model of
randomly formed connections (Newman 2006). In the multi-network context,
each network can be thought of as a slice of a larger structure in which occur-
rences of a vertex in different networks are linked by user-specified weights, and
the multiplex community detection algorithm adapts Newman’s spectral parti-
tioning approach to search for a high modularity partition. Chapter 2 provides
full details on the algorithm.
8This is an over-simplification for some cases: for example, in the UAE government authority
is split among seven federated states.
63
Prior research on the role of network connections in structuring business
groups suggests that the communities found by the algorithm might correspond
to these important structures. For example, Fisman (2001) notes that the data he
purchased from consultants in Indonesia to evaluate the relevance of regime
instability on the valuation of politically connected groups was based on their
assessment of the directors and owners of various firms. Furthermore, Khanna
and Rivkin (2006) find in their analysis of business group comembership in
Chile that director-interlocks and ownership are significant predictors of two
firms belonging to the same group.
An important drawback to modularity-based methods, however, is that
there is no guarantee that a given network will have a clearly optimal parti-
tion, and highly dissimilar partitions can have similar modularity values (Good
et al. 2010). I approach this difficulty from three directions. First, by taking
the communities themselves as a unit of analysis, I distinguished family- and
government-dominated communities from those lacking a clear basis of affili-
ation, and in the previous chapter this is done without using the supplemen-
tal family and government information as an input to the algorithm (Siemon
2017). Finding such distinctive communities thus proves that at least some of
the groups are meaningful. Second, adding data that reflects expectations about
where groups might be found should improve the reliability of the method.
Although the supplemental family and government networks contain a lim-
ited amount of structural information, when included as slices of the multiplex
structure they provide greater certainty to the algorithm if they correspond to
similarly located concentrations of director-interlock and ownership ties; and
are easily ignored if they do not. Finally, testing the results against indepen-
dently generated but related data would provide perhaps the strongest verifica-
64
tion, short of comparing them against true group labels. While family and gov-
ernment measures are useful insofar as they leverage extra information about
the specific attributes of vertices in the network, this information is still derived
from the same networks that were used to infer the communities. Pairwise price
correlations, on the other hand, provide a completely separate weighted net-
work with which to compare the results.
3.3.4 Variable Construction
In order to test the hypotheses described above, I use a measure derived from
the community detection analysis, as well as direct observations of joint gov-
ernment ownership. The latter is defined as the geometric mean of the percent
of each firm’s shares owned by government-affiliated organizations. If the ma-
jority of a public firm’s shares are government-owned, I code that firm as a gov-
ernment entity for the purposes of computing the government ownership of its
subsidiaries. The community measure is a proxy for comembership in a family
business group and is defined as belonging to the same community and having
a member of the most prominent family in that group as a chairman, deputy
chairman, top manager, or owner. I also include assignment to the same two-
and three-digit SIC codes in the analysis to mitigate the confounding influence
of being active in the same industry.
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3.3.5 Data Description
Table 3.1 presents a summary of the data at the exchange level as well as for
the entire sample. It includes only dyads involving the 1128 firms with 100 or
more days of non-zero returns during the 2010-2016 period. Of the 1373 pub-
lic firms with information on mubasher.com, I matched 1293 with one or more
Datastream records. Of these 80 unmatched firms, 63 were listed on the Egyp-
tian Exchange with no other exchange having more than 5. The number of firms
on each exchange is thus a product of its size as well as liquidity. The sum of
firms listed on each exchange is slightly lower than the total number of firms
because of cross-listings. The mean price correlations also vary substantially by
exchange. These quantities mirror the R2 measures described above for the cases
of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and more data will be presented about the relation-
ships between exchange-level characteristics and the dyadic analysis in the next
section. The density measures refer to the number of observed connections on
an exchange divided by the total number of possible dyads.
Table 3.2 describes the dropped observations and compares them to all
dyads involving firms that were matched with a Datastream record. Excluded
data are most significant for Bahrain and Oman, but as noted above, Egypt also
had a disproportionate number of firms that were not covered at all by Datas-
tream and hence not added to the overall data set. In comparison with the entire
sample, excluded observations tend to have lower mean price correlation and
have higher standard deviations among the correlation measures, which reflects
the greater noise among the dropped data. Relational measures are broadly sim-
ilar, with the key exception of family group dyads. A majority of these ties are
excluded in Oman, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Egypt. An alternative approach
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would be to keep these data and compensate for their greater noise by weight-
ing them according to a function of the inverse of the number of non-zero daily
returns. Doing so produces results with similar magnitude, but greater uncer-
tainty compared with those presented below. I plan to explore this approach
more in a future version of this paper. In the meantime, I prefer simply to ex-
clude them on the grounds that prices with fewer than 100 non-zero returns out
of over 1600 trading days are not likely to be very informative. Nevertheless,
100 is an arbitrary cutoff, and choosing an appropriate function for generating
sample weights would allow for more flexibility than the binary choice of inclu-
sion or exclusion.
3.4 Methods
I employ a Bayesian multilevel robust linear regression model to estimate the
association between inter-firm relationships and stock-price similarity. This
section first describes the basics of Bayesian statistical modeling as well as
the reasons for preferring this approach to more traditional analyses that use
maximum-likelihood and p-values. Next, it describes the multilevel structure
of the model, which accounts for the clustering of dyads within exchanges and
firms, as well as the use of a t-distribution to model prediction errors. Finally,
it describes the estimation technique used to fit the model, which relies on sam-
pling parameter values from their distributions given the data and prior expec-
tations about their likely values.
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3.4.1 Bayesian Analysis
Bayesian methods can be defined as an alternative to the type of statistical anal-
ysis that has historically dominated the social sciences. This traditional ap-
proach is often referred to as “frequentist” in the Bayesian literature, reflecting
its emphasis on sample size in determining the validity of inferences through
mechanisms like p-values. Hypothesis testing under this framework relies on
the thought-experiment of repeatedly obtaining a similar data set according to
the same data-generating process, although such replication is often impracti-
cal for observational studies. A p-value of 0.05 for a null hypothesis test thus
implies that if the null hypothesis were true and we were given 100 such repli-
cations, we would expect only 5 of them to generate a sample statistic, such as a
regression coefficient, larger than that returned by the observed data. Further-
more, frequentist statistical inferences typically take the form of single point-
estimates of unknown population parameters that maximize the likelihood of
observed data under a given model. The validity of these estimates is a direct
function of sample size in the sense that sample statistics will converge to a
population parameter as the size of the sample grows.
In contrast, Bayesian methods avoid the sometimes counter-intuitive idea of
replicated datasets, and instead focus on the full distribution of an estimated pa-
rameter given observed data and prior beliefs. Bayesian interval representations
of estimated parameters thus have the more immediate interpretation that is of-
ten often incorrectly given to frequentist confidence intervals, namely that that
the unknown parameter has a given probability of being within certain range
(Gelman et al. 2014, p. 33). Such distributions depend on the model, observed
data, and prior beliefs, and the first two are combined to form the likelihood
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while the latter is referred to as the prior. These two elements are combined to
generate a posterior distribution for the unknown quantities of interest. This
process is at the core of Bayesian inference and yields several desirable features,
such as a reduced dependence on large sample sizes, greater model flexibility,
and explicit representations of uncertainty. To realize these benefits, however,
the analyst must carefully specify both the structure of the model and the prior
distributions of parameters. Furthermore, because they derive parameter distri-
butions by combining the likelihood with prior information, Bayesian models
can rarely be estimated by maximum-likelihood algorithms and instead rely
on computationally intensive sampling routines to approximate these posterior
distributions.
I chose to model the data with Bayesian methods primarily because of their
greater flexibility. Because of the difficulty of deriving precise point-estimates
for important parameters, maximum-likelihood algorithms for multilevel mod-
els can encounter difficulties when dealing with non-nested structures, multiple
coefficients that vary by group, and small numbers of groups (Gelman and Hill
2007, p. 345). Each of these issues applies to the current analysis.
3.4.2 Model
I estimate the association between relational measures and stock-price similarity
using a multilevel robust linear regression model. A multilevel structure is use-
ful in this case because it allows important coefficients to vary by exchange. Al-
ternative approaches would be to estimate separate models for each exchange,
for example by including interactions between an exchange indicator and all
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coefficients of interest, or else to estimate a single coefficient for all exchanges.
The first approach allows for flexibility at the cost of ignoring information from
other exchanges, while the second ignores the structure of the data in favor
of including all available data into a single estimate. Multilevel modeling is a
compromise between these two approaches, and in a Bayesian framework these
types of models allow the data and prior to explicitly determine the extent to
which group-specific estimates are drawn toward the posterior estimate of the
higher-level parameter (Gelman and Hill 2007, p. 251). This occurs through
the estimation of a covariance matrix for all coefficients that vary by exchange,
which is used along with the overall mean and data to estimate the particular
value for each group. For example, firm-level intercepts .
Multilevel models have a long history of being used to model dyadic data
(Van Duijn et al. 1999; Zijlstra et al. 2006). Analyses of data from multiple net-
work structures often take their observations from a set of distinct but com-
parable units like schools or families, and multilevel models are an effective
means of incorporating heterogeneity among clusters of observations. Further-
more, the mixed structure of multilevel models, which allows for combinations
of coefficients that are either constant or varying across groups, include popular
network models as a special case. A fundamental challenge for regression anal-
yses of dyadic data is that observations are not independent, due to the fact that
measures from two dyads that include the same node will tend to be correlated
as a result of the shared influence of that node’s characteristics. One strategy for
addressing this issue is to decompose the error terms into node-specific effects
and conditionally independent dyad-level residuals (Van Duijn et al. 2004). This
approach is similar to the idea of non-nested multilevel models, which allow for
each observation to be associated with multiple overlapping group indicators,
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each having their own intercept.
Because the Fisher-transformed stock-price correlations are a continuous
measure of firm similarity, they can be predicted with a linear regression model.
However, as noted in the previous section, they are over-dispersed relative to
a normal distribution, and the heavy tails of the country-specific distributions
is indicative of the presence of numerous outliers. To mitigate the influence of
these outliers, I fit a robust linear regression that replaces the usual assumption
of a normal distribution of the model residuals with a t-distribution (Gelman
et al. 2014, p. 444). This allows the model to more easily ignore extreme obser-
vations by assigning a greater probability to large residual values, at the cost of
estimating an extra degrees of freedom parameter for the residual distribution.
Taking the preceding factors into account, the model has the following form:
yi = βxTi + γ jz
T
i + δk + δl + i (3.1)
where i is the index of the dyad composed of nodes k and l; j is the index of
the exchange where dyad i was observed; yi is the Fisher-transformed stock
price correlation; xi is a vector containing the variables whose associations with
price comovement does not vary by exchange in the model; and zi contains
the other variables whose coefficients are allowed to vary. I chose to constrain
direct ownership to be constant across exchanges because it has the straight-
forward economic implication that one firm is entitled to a share of profits of
another and thus contrasts with the more ambiguous relationships implied by
shared ownership or business group comembership. I did not allow the indus-
try coefficients to vary because it is likely that the greatest variation in their
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impact occurs among industries rather than among locations. Both cases, how-
ever, were foremost a practical decision since each additional coefficient that is
allowed to vary by group significantly increases the computation time. Their
variation is simply less interesting in this context than the other variables, but I
do plan to test alternative specifications in a future version of this paper.
Returning to the model, β is a vector of group-invariant coefficients and the
other parameters of the model are defined as follows:
γ j ∼ N(µγ,Σγ) (3.2)
δk ∼ N(0, σ2δ) (3.3)
δl ∼ N(0, σ2δ) (3.4)
i ∼ tν(0, σ2) (3.5)
where γ j is a vector of varying coefficients corresponding to exchange j, which
includes an intercept term; µγ is a vector of the mean values of each coefficient
in γ j for the overall sample; Σγ is a covariance matrix that includes information
on the variance of each coefficient among the different exchanges as well as the
covariances between different coefficients; δk and δl are node-specific intercepts
for firms k and l, respectively, with a variance σ2δ; i is the residual for dyad i; and
ν and σ are the degrees of freedom and scale for the t-distribution, respectively.
Compared to basic forms of linear regression, the model defined by Equa-
tion 3.1 adopts a more elaborate structure in order to conform to basic assump-
tions about how the data were generated. This structure is represented not only
by partitioning the predictors into sets of constant and varying coefficients, but
also by the additional parameters in Equation 3.2, Equation 3.3, Equation 3.4,
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and Equation 3.5. These values are referred to as hyper-parameters since their
role is to define the distributions of the model parameters. For example, µγ
can be thought of as a vector of the group-invariant estimates for the regres-
sion coefficients corresponding to each variable in zi, and the coefficient for any
particular exchange is thus a deviation from this value. The magnitude of this
deviation depends on they hyper parameter as well as the data Σγ.
3.4.3 Prior Distributions
As noted above, Bayesian inference involves estimating the posterior distribu-
tions of model parameters, which depend on both the likelihood function of
the observed data under the model as well as the prior distributions of param-
eters, which encode a researcher’s expectations about parameter values before
analyzing the data. Whether due to a lack of prior research or the number of
hyper-parameters, however, strong prior knowledge is not always available or
practical to include, and it might in any case be desirable to make inferences
directly from the data at hand and with minimal interference from prior as-
sumptions. In order to fit the above model, I rely on weakly-informative priors,
which are defined as including less information than might be available but nev-
ertheless incorporating knowledge of basic constraints necessary to obtain rea-
sonable parameter values (Gelman et al. 2014, p. 55). For example, correlations
are constrained with in the interval [−1, 1], and even after performing the Fisher
transformation the difference between the maximum and minimum value of the
dependent variable is only 4.42. Furthermore, the difference between any two
other observations is likely to be much lower, and I thus assign a normal prior
distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 5 for the exchange-
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invariant coefficients and the means of the varying coefficients9. Another exam-
ple of this type of weak constraint involves variance hyper-parameters, which
must be non-negative. More formally, the various prior distributions for the
model parameters described above are as follows:
βn ∼ N(0, 52) (3.6)
µγm ∼ N(0, 52) (3.7)
where n and m index the exchange-invariant and varying coefficients, respec-
tively. Σγ is decomposed into a vector of coefficient standard deviations, σγ,
and off-diagonal correlations Ωγ such that:
Σγ = D(σγ)ΩγD(σγ) (3.8)
where D(σγ) is a square diagonal matrix such that Dmm = σγm where m indexes
the parameters that vary by exchange and all elements are 0. Ωγ and σγ are a
vector and matrix, respectively, defined by the following prior distributions:
σγm ∼ half-t3(1) (3.9)
Ωγ ∼ LKJ(1) (3.10)
where LKJ(ζ) refers to the LKJ-Correlation prior (Lewandowski et al. 2009) and
half-t denotes a centered t-distribution that is “folded” at zero. The remaining
9Because the data consist of both binary and percent values, a more informative prior
might assign a higher standard deviation to the percent variables. However, having the same
prior across all coefficients leads to an important speed increase for the estimation algorithm
(Buerkner 2017)
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parameters are given the following weakly-informative priors:
σδ ∼ half-t3(1) (3.11)
ν ∼ gamma(2, 0.1) (3.12)
σ ∼ half-t1(σy) (3.13)
where σy is the standard deviation of the dependent variable. With the excep-
tion of the priors for the coefficients in Equation 3.6and Equation 3.7, all of the
above priors are the defaults suggested by the software used to fit the model
(Buerkner 2017, see).
3.4.4 Model Estimation
Bayesian models are typically fit using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods which take samples from a target distribution until they converge to
a stable representation of the desired values. There are several variations on
this approach, and this paper is indebted to recent advances in Hamiltonian
Monte Carlo (HMC) that have been made widely available through the Stan
statistical platform (Carpenter et al. 2016). Compared to other staple techniques
like Metropolis-Hastings and Gibbs samplers, HMC reduces the random-walk
behavior of successive samples by using information from the gradient of the
log-likelihood to produce weakly correlated draws that still converge to the ap-
propriate distribution (Gelman et al. 2014, p. 300). HMC, however, depends on
parameters which must be tuned during the analysis in order to ensure efficient
and accurate results. A core feature of Stan is that it uses the recently devel-
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oped no-U-turn sampler (NUTS) and other methods to automate this process
(Hoffman and Gelman 2014). The use of Stan, which was developed in C++,
has been facilitated by packages in other languages that make use of its tools,
and this study uses the Bayesian Regression Models using Stan (brms) package
in R (Buerkner 2017).
3.5 Results
This section presents the results of the analysis in four parts. First, it briefly
discusses the community detection procedure with a focus on how the inter-
slice strength parameters were tuned to best fit the data. Next, it presents the
distributions of the estimated parameters from the multilevel model. It then at-
tempts to verify the validity of the model by comparing predicted values to the
observed data. Finally, it briefly compares the variation in coefficient estimates
with characteristics of the exchanges.
3.5.1 Community Detection Parameters
Detecting communities from multiple networks requires the analyst to set the
strength of the connections between instances of the same node across the dif-
ferent slices, and this value can vary among different pairs of networks (Mucha
et al. 2010). For example, in order to analyze a series of observations of the same
network across time it might make sense to connect each slice with only the
previous and next observation, but the analyst must still decide how strongly to
couple the different cross-sections based on their theoretical expectation of the
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stability of the underlying communities relative to frequency of noisy variations
in the observed ties.
Applying the technique to the four cross-sectional networks described above
requires two fundamental choices. First, a node will not necessarily belong to
the same community across different networks, and this leads to four options
for assessing group comembership based on assignment to the same commu-
nity in one of the following ways: in the ownership network, in the interlock
network, in both networks, or at least one of the two. Second, in any of the above
cases the results will also depend on the strength of the connections among the
different networks. Several scenarios appear plausible. For example, if one net-
work is a significantly better indicator of underlying comembership than the
other, then it would make sense to favor relatively weak connections and take
measurements based on that network. On the other hand, if the networks are
equally informative, then it might be better to enforce a strong connection be-
tween them and code communities based on membership in either network. A
third possibility is that most of the network ties do not reflect group comember-
ship; but that where groups do exist, there are concentrations of connections in
both networks. In this case, the best solution would be to favor weak connec-
tions, and to measure communities based on community comembership in both
networks.
I attempt to choose among these scenarios using the data themselves. Be-
cause the goal is to correctly identify family business groups, I measured vari-
ous dimensions of family control at the community level as described in Chapter
2. I then compared a range of strengths of connections among the different net-
works across the four measurement schemes according to their ability to iden-
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Figure 3.4: The four networks used in the multiplex community detection analysis are shown as
nodes in a multi-network structure. The number by each edge is the strength of the connection
between each network. Networks with no edge are not connected.
tify the greatest number of communities with the highest level of family control.
Based on this comparison, I chose to measure family groups based on commu-
nity comembership in the ownership network using the inter-slice connections
shown in Figure 3.4. Overall, these parameters reflect the greater relevance of
ownership ties for indicating group structures, although interlocks still influ-
ence the algorithm. I did not include connections between the government net-
work and the family and interlock networks because they have no shared nodes.
The government network’s tie to the ownership network is stronger than those
coming from the family network in order to reflect the possibility that shared
surnames do not indicate family ties.
3.5.2 Multilevel Regression
The model in Equation 3.1 was estimated using four simultaneous HMC chains,
each with a total of 2000 sampling draws. The first 1000 draws in each chain
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were considered a warm-up phase during which the algorithm searches for a
high-probability area of the parameter space. The inferences reported below are
thus based on a total of 4000 draws from the second half of each chain. The use
of multiple chains allows for a metric to assess the convergence of the sampling
algorithm by comparing the within- and between-chain variance of the sampled
values, known as Rˆ. An Rˆ of over 1.1 indicates further samples are necessary
for convergence (Gelman et al. 2014, p. 285). All of the parameters from the
estimated model had a value of between 1.0 and 1.01.
Table 3.3 presents the 0.025 percentile, median, and 0.975 percentile of the
estimated distributions of the entire-sample coefficients. This includes both the
invariant coefficients for direct ownership and shared industry as well as the
other variables whose coefficient vary by exchange. The latter category is ac-
companied by the median of the corresponding σγ parameter, which indicates
the standard deviation of the coefficient among the different exchanges. These
entire-sample estimates broadly support the hypotheses that director interlocks,
shared ownership, family group comembership, and government ownership
are each associated with an independent increase in firm synchronicity. With
the key exception of family group comebership, all of the corresponding pa-
rameters do not include zero in their 95% posterior intervals. The median of the
distribution of the family group comembership parameter is large compared to
director interlocks and comparable to shared industry, but shows much greater
uncertainty. For example, zero falls at the 0.056 percentile, while at the other
end the 0.944 percentile falls at 0.063, meaning that the overall mean of the pa-
rameter is just as likely to be above 0.063 as it is to be below zero.
However, these mean estimates only show one part of the picture. As the
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Coefficient 2.5% Median 97.5% σγ
Intercept 0.071 0.150 0.231 0.132
Shared Director 0.002 0.009 0.018 0.009
Direct Ownership 0.056 0.090 0.128 -
Shared Ownership 0.074 0.153 0.241 0.105
Squared Shared Ownership -0.311 -0.153 -0.020 0.170
Same Family Group -0.009 0.030 0.074 0.057
Government Ownership 0.020 0.062 0.101 0.040
Squared Gov. Ownership -0.131 -0.076 -0.024 0.025
Same 2-Digit SIC 0.015 0.018 0.022 -
Same 3-Digit SIC 0.028 0.033 0.038 -
Table 3.3: Median and 95% posterior intervals for entire-sample coefficients.
σγ column indicates, there is substantial variation in the parameters across the
different exchanges. Figure 3.5 shows the exchange intercepts in the form of
the exchange-specific deviation plus the overall mean from Table 3.3 plotted
against the exchanges’ overall R2 value for the entire sample period. The strong
linear relationship supports the similarity between traditional R2 measures and
dyadic synchronicity. The one exception is Bahrain, likely due to a combina-
tion of a small number of firms and low liquidity, and more will be said on this
anomaly below. Each firm also has its own intercept parameter that applies to
all dyads of which it is a member. Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 plot the median
value of these intercepts relative to the number of days with non-zero returns
and R2 for each firm, respectively. Exchanges are indicated in both figures by
different shapes in order to give a sense of how the relationship varies in differ-
ent contexts. In Figure 3.6 the number of non-zero returns has a weakly positive
relationship with the firm-intercept, but this relationship is stronger for some
exchanges such, such as Egypt, represented by the triangles visible on the lower
half of the figure. 3.7 again displays a strong relationship between R2 measures
and model intercepts. Taken together, these three figures provide evidence that
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Figure 3.5: The total exchange-specific intercepts are plotted relative to their R2 values for re-
gressing daily non-zero returns on an unweighted daily index of the exchange’s average return
over the 2010-2016 period. Points are sized according to the relative uncertainty of the estimates.
Figure 3.6: Median raw firm-specific intercepts are plotted relative to their number of non-zero
daily returns. The exchange of a firm is indicated by the shape of each point in order to provide
an impression of the overall variation in the relationship.
the model captures meaningful differences in the baseline synchronicity at both
the firm- and exchange-level.
Table 3.3 provides initial evidence in support of the hypotheses predicting
positive associations between firm relationships and price synchronicity, but it
remains to assess how the estimated parameters vary by exchange. Figure 3.8
83
Figure 3.7: Median raw firm-specific intercepts are plotted relative to their R2 values for regress-
ing their daily non-zero returns on an unweighted daily index of the exchange’s average return
over the 2010-2016 period. The exchange of a firm is indicated by the shape of each point in order
to provide an impression of the overall variation in the relationship.
displays the magnitude and uncertainty of the director interlock and shared
ownership coefficients for each exchange. Focusing first on shared ownership,
the exchanges can be divided into three rough categories: Dubai, Kuwait, Jor-
dan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, and Egypt have estimated distributions that are
far from zero; Palestine, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, and to a lesser extent Oman have
large median estimates coupled with 95% posterior intervals that marginally
include zero; and finally Tunisia and Morocco have median estimates closer to
zero and a greater share of negative values in their posterior intervals. A chal-
lenge in interpreting these estimates is distinguishing between the noisiness of
the data and the underlying mechanisms that structure price synchronicity in
the region, but referring back to Table 3.1 shows that the first group includes
the largest exchanges in the region as well as Qatar, Dubai, and Iraq, while the
second group of exchanges have the fewest listed firms.
The relationship between synchronicity and director-interlocks appears less
robust compared with shared ownership. Only Kuwait, Egypt, and Morocco
84
Fi
gu
re
3.
8:
Ba
rs
in
di
ca
te
th
em
ed
ia
n
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
es
tim
at
ef
or
ea
ch
ex
ch
an
ge
,a
nd
th
el
in
es
sh
ow
th
ee
xt
en
to
ft
he
95
%
po
st
er
io
ri
nt
er
va
ls
.T
he
sc
al
es
of
th
e
sh
ar
ed
ow
ne
rs
hi
p
an
d
sh
ar
ed
di
re
ct
or
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
ar
e
sh
ow
n
on
th
e
le
ft
an
d
ri
gh
ty
-a
xe
s,
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
85
have an estimated distributions with a 97.5% probability of being greater than
zero. The other exchanges have both smaller median values and a large propor-
tion of negative values in their 95% posterior intervals. When taken as a whole,
all but two of the exchanges have a median value that falls between 0.005 and
0.015, which helps to explain why the distribution of the mean parameter for
the entire sample presented in Table 3.3 nevertheless has a 95% posterior inter-
val between 0.002 and 0.018.
Interpreting the substantive meaning of the coefficients for these predictors
is simple in the case of director interlocks because as a binary variable it rep-
resents the mean difference between interlock and non-interlock dyads condi-
tional on the other predictors in the model. Shared ownership, however, is not
only continuous but also modeled as having a quadratic relationship with price
synchronicity. Figure 3.9 displays the median and 95% posterior interval for the
overall effect of increasing shared ownership for each exchange. Each figure
also provides a histogram indicating the relative frequency of different shared
ownership values to give a sense of the amount of data relevant to each part
of the curve. As the cases of Dubai and Saudi Arabia show, there is little sup-
port for the decreasing areas of the curves, and the negative coefficients for the
squared terms instead reflect that the marginal effect of shared ownership levels
off at high values. Overall, a shared ownership value of 0.25 is associated with
a median increase in correlation between 0.015 and 0.050 for all countries except
Morocco and Tunisia.
Director-interlock and shared ownership ties are a basic part of the complex
web of relationships that link firms to one another. Family business groups and
government ownership are examples of the variety of other connections that
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might be more salient to the control and performance of large corporations. Fig-
ure 3.10 shows the coefficients for these two variables in each exchange. Starting
on the left of the figure, Dubai, Kuwait, Palestine, Abu Dhabi, Jordan, and Oman
all show strong evidence that family business group comembership, as mea-
sured by the presence of family members within the same network community,
is an important predictor of stock price similarity. Indeed, compared with the re-
sults for director-interlocks in Figure 3.8 or the marginal effect of shared owner-
ship in Figure 3.9, these coefficients are large, indicating that markets perceive a
much closer relationship between these types of firms than between other pairs
of firms that might have similar ownership or director-interlock connections
without the underlying family business group. The other six exchanges, how-
ever, do not show a meaningful relationship between family business groups
and price comovement. These six exchanges include only 79 of the 347 total
family business group dyads, and of these 79, 47 are in Qatar. A smaller num-
ber of relevant observations should increase the uncertainty of the estimates,
but does not account for the fact that many of the median values are near or
substantially below zero.
At least three factors might explain these null results. First, the community
detection method might not succeed in capturing the relevant groups in each
exchange. There is evidence for this explanation in at least two cases. Mo-
rocco has a few well-documented family business groups, the largest of which
is associated with the royal family, and the results of the community detection
analysis only partially agree with other characterizations of this group (Saadi
1989; Oubenal 2016). Qatar, which has more family dyads that the rest of these
six combined, appears to be uniquely unsuitable for the method of looking for
shared surnames among individuals associated with firms in the same commu-
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nity, because members of the ruling Al Thani family hold chairman or director
positions in a majority of public firms. This is reflected in the abnormally high
density of shared director ties reported in Table 3.1. A second explanation is that
family business groups might have disproportionately poor data, and hence the
estimated coefficient is based on a non-random subset of ties. For example, there
are 54 firms on the Egyptian exchange that belong to cluster containing a family
that is involved in more than one firm, but only 28 of these have enough data to
be included in the model. In terms of family group dyads, however, this yields
only 7 out of a total of 37 possible observations10 because often only one firm in
a group has enough data, which means that no pairwise observations are possi-
ble within that cluster. Furthermore, many of these dyads are from clusters that
have weaker evidence of being associated with a true family business group,
as measured by total family participation or mean family ownership. Finally, it
might also be the case that the prices on a particular exchange simply do not re-
act to group-specific events, and given the fact that it shows no clear association
between price synchronicity and any other relational measure, Tunisia appears
to fit this category.
The association between government ownership and price comovement also
varies between the different exchanges. Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
Egypt, Bahrain, and Morocco all have estimated coefficients with a 95% poste-
rior interval that is greater than zero. Among the other exchanges, the greater
uncertainty for Dubai and Abu Dhabi might reflect the need to disaggregate the
governments of the seven emirates that make up the UAE. The lack of any ev-
idence for the influence of government ownership in Palestine can perhaps be
attributed to its unique status under Israeli occupation. The role of government
10The number of possible dyads is higher here than in Table 3.2 because many firms had no
Datastream data at all and hence were not included in the table.
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ownership in Tunisia is again consistent with the low information content of its
price variations. Iraq and Oman are more ambiguous, and given the relatively
high uncertainty for the other coefficients in the model, the results might reflect
either the uneven information content of price changes or a true ambivalence
on the part of market participants about the impact of state ownership on firm
governance and performance.
Figure 3.11 shows the marginal effect of increasing government ownership
according to the model. The layout is similar to that of Figure 3.9. Including
the coefficients of the squared terms for each exchange shows the further nu-
ance that among the exchanges with 95% posterior intervals that do not include
zero, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have the highest marginal effect with low uncer-
tainty even for high government ownership; while the posterior intervals for
Egypt, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco dip below zero for high values.
The marginal effect of government ownership is smaller than shared ownership
because it reflects the additional synchronicity between firms owned by govern-
ment organizations relative to those with any shared owner.
3.5.3 Predictive Checks of Model Fit
The model specification and estimation presented above are two essential fea-
tures of Bayesian analysis but are incomplete without an evaluation of the fit
of the estimated model (Gelman et al. 2014, p. 139). This evaluation is typi-
cally performed through posterior predictive checks that compare the observed
values of the dependent variable with simulated data generated by draws from
the fitted distributions of the model parameters (Lynch and Western 2004; Gel-
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man et al. 1996). This comparison can be made by specifying a test-statistic that
describes a key feature of the data that the model is designed to capture. A dis-
tribution of this statistic under the model is then calculated using the simulated
outcomes.
The central claim underlying this paper is that community detection anal-
ysis can infer family business groups as a latent feature of inter-firm networks
in the Middle East. The multilevel model in Equation 3.1 was designed to test
this claim by searching for heightened synchronicity between pairs of firms in
the same inferred business group, relative to other firms with observed con-
nections but no inferred group comembership. Hence, the difference between
the mean synchronicity of family business group dyads and that of dyads with
other observed connections can be used to assess the model’s ability to capture
the impact of these inferred relationships. I calculated this difference using two
subsets: dyads with family group ties and dyads with at least one direct owner-
ship, director-interlock, or shared ownership tie but less than 0.05 government
ownership and no family group comembership. Figure 3.12 shows the distri-
bution of this statistic for 500 replications generated by random draws from the
posterior distribution given by the model relative to the observed data. The
statistic from the observed data is greater than 79.8% of the simulated values
derived from the model, and graphically falls within the main body of the dis-
tribution, indicating a reasonable fit.
I followed a similar procedure to test the model’s ability to capture the addi-
tional synchronicity among dyads with significant government ownership rel-
ative to dyads with other non-family business group ties. Figure 3.13 shows
the observed versus simulated values for this statistic. The observed statistic is
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Figure 3.12: The black line shows the observed difference in the mean synchronicity of family
group dyads and dyads with other types of observed, non-government connections relative to the
distribution of this statistic, derived from 500 sets of simulated values. The percent at the top of
the figure is the percent of simulated statistics less than or equal to the observed value.
Figure 3.13: The black line shows the observed difference in the mean synchronicity of
government-owned dyads and dyads with other types of observed, non-family connections rela-
tive to the distribution of this statistic, derived from 500 sets of simulated values. The percent at
the top of the figure is the percent of simulated statistics less than or equal to the observed value.
greater than 15.2% of the simulated values and again falls within the main body
of the distributions, as opposed to its tail.
Statistical models are necessarily oversimplifications of actual relationships,
but these posterior predictive checks provide confidence that the model in Equa-
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tion 3.1 is capable of reproducing relevant aspects of the observed data. These
assessments are possible because Bayesian estimates provide the full distribu-
tion model parameters, and each sample from their joint distribution can be
used to provide a simulation of the expected value of the outcome variable.
These expected values can also be used to check for dependence among the
residuals by estimating the correlation between the errors of different observa-
tions over the replicated outcomes. Figure 3.14 evaluates the assumption that
the dyad-specific residuals are independent conditional on firm random inter-
cepts by plotting the mean correlation among between all dyad residuals in-
volving each firm in the sample. Each point represents a single firm, and the
mean residual correlation is plotted on the y-axis relative to the number of non-
zero returns for that firm on the x-axis. A large number of points not clustered
at zero would indicate that the observations are not conditionally independent.
The exchange of each firm is indicated by its shape. Overall, 93.7% of firms
have a mean residual correlation of less than 0.01, and 98.4% have a value of
less than 0.02. The 18 firms with a mean of over 0.02 are visible in the upper
left of Figure 3.14, and of these 2 are listed on the Dubai Financial Market, 3
are from the Muscat Securities Market in Oman, and the remaining 13 belong to
the Bahrain Bourse. Moreover, the Bahraini firms are clearly visible due to their
aberrantly high residual correlations and low number of non-zero returns. This
echoes the pattern in Figure 3.5 where Bahrain was the only exchange whose
intercept deviated from what might be expected from its R2 value. Given these
inconsistencies, and that there are only 20 Bahraini firms in the data with over
100 non-zero returns, I plan to drop Bahrain in a future version of this paper.
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Figure 3.14: The mean residual correlation of the dyads involving each firm are plotted relative
to that firm’s number of non-zero returns. Exchanges are indicated by the shape of each point.
Note the number of Bahraini firms represented by the circles in the top-left of the figure.
3.5.4 Coefficients and Exchange Level Characteristics
The model in this paper has focused on the intermediate pooling of coefficient
estimates allowed by multilevel models, but another important strength of the
method is that multilevel modeling allows for the simultaneous inclusion of
predictors at different observation levels. Higher-level variables can be used not
only to predict the outcome directly but also to test hypotheses about how the
qualities of higher-level units influence the coefficients of lower-level predictors.
Including group-level predictors can improve the estimation of a model, since
the additional information might reduce the variance of the coefficients that are
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allowed to vary between different groups. Despite these potential benefits, I
chose to limit the model to dyad-level predictors for three reasons. First, there
is little prior work to inform how exchange-level attributes might influence the
relationship between inter-firm ties and price synchronicity. Furthermore, the
small number of exchanges compounds this challenge by likely yielding uncer-
tain estimates that might not be generalizable to exchanges in other regions. The
number of firms, on the other hand, is much higher, but they are less relevant
for the purpose of the model as long as their random intercepts allow for the
conditional independence of the dyad observations.
This section presents a exploratory analysis by investigating the correlations
between five exchange- and country-level attributes, and three varying coef-
ficients from the model. While stopping short of including them in our full
model, this approach allows us to at least evaluate the strength of possible bi-
variate relationship. The exchange-level variables are: market liquidity, mea-
sured as the average of the value of monthly trades on an exchange divided by
its capitalization; an R2 synchronicity measure as defined above; a governance
index composed of four World Bank World Governance Indicators11; an index
of three shareholder control measures from the World Bank Ease of Doing Busi-
ness database12; and an index of four minority investor protection measures
from the same source13. The correlations of these variables with the coefficients
for family business group comembership, shared ownership, and government
ownership were calculated for each of the 4000 samples from the posterior dis-
11Government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. I ex-
cluded Voice and Accountability because it has relatively little variation in the region and sta-
bility because it is weakly correlated with the other four.
12Extent of shareholder governance, extent of ownership and control, and extent of corporate
transparency
13Extent of conflict of interest regulation, strength of minority investor protection, extent of
disclosure, and extent of director liability.
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Family Business Group Shared Ownership Government Onwership
2.5% Median 97.5% 2.5% Median 97.5% 2.5% Median 97.5%
Market Liquidity -0.101 0.212 0.427 0.059 0.384 0.660 -0.021 0.411 0.775
R2 -0.174 0.227 0.566 -0.001 0.399 0.698 -0.037 0.462 0.759
Governance -0.065 0.352 0.613 -0.442 -0.055 0.302 -0.340 0.099 0.492
Shareholder Control -0.300 -0.063 0.230 -0.323 -0.023 0.279 -0.360 0.090 0.480
Investor Protections 0.273 0.592 0.761 -0.086 0.306 0.636 -0.359 0.069 0.515
Table 3.4: The distribution of each correlation measure is calculated based on the full distribution
of the model coefficients.
tribution, in order to represent the uncertainty of the estimated correlation. The
95% posterior intervals and median of each correlation value are presented in
Table 3.4.
As expected from the small sample size, the estimates are quite noisy,
but two results are notable. First, minority investor protections appear to be
strongly associated with the value relevance of family business groups. Gover-
nance quality shows a weaker relationship. Second, market liquidity and over-
all price synchronicity are moderately linked with the relevance of shared own-
ership and government ownership. These correlations suggest potentially fruit-
ful areas for future research on the political economy of financial markets in the
Middle East and North Africa. For example, do value-relevant family groups
advocate for investor protections, or is it perhaps the case that their synchronic-
ity is only observable because these regulations strengthen the price mecha-
nism by encouraging outside investment in closely held firms? On the other
hand, what are the links between liquidity, overall-synchronicity, and owner-
ship? It seems plausible that exchange-level synchronicity would be buttressed
by widespread co-ownership, and that higher trade volume would improve the
value-relevance of interconnections relative to random noise, but what exactly is
the role of government ownership in this process? In any case, the tenuousness
of these results must emphasized. Not only are they based on 13 data points,
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but at least two of these, Tunisia and Bahrain, appear to have poor enough data
to warrant skepticism that they provide useful information.
3.6 Conclusion
This study has combined direct observations and inferred ties in order to study
the role of corporate governance relationships in structuring price synchronicity
between publicly traded firms in the Middle East and North Africa. In doing so,
it makes three contributions to the literatures on inter-firm networks, financial
development, the Middle East and North Africa, and emerging markets more
generally. First, it provides estimates on the value-relevance of family business
groups, government ownership, shared ownership, and director-interlocks in
13 exchanges throughout the region. These results are substantively important
as direct measures of the importance of business groups and state control, but
also have a more technical interpretation in that they can serve as a proxy for the
ability of prices in a market to reflect detailed information about firm relation-
ships. Second, it confirms the validity of using community detection methods
from network analysis to measure business groups for at least 7 of the 13 ex-
changes. These results help make the case for using this type of unsupervised
learning technique to study the role of business groups in the Middle East and
North Africa, as well as other regions where direct observations are difficult
to obtain. Furthermore, they also show that pairwise price synchronicity con-
stitutes an additional network that can be used to improve the results of such
procedures. Finally, it presents initial findings on the links between the value
relevance of family business groups and minority-shareholder protections, as
well as among market liquidity and synchronicity and shared ownership, both
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governmental and otherwise.
As a whole, these findings have the potential to encourage more system-
atic research on the economic sociology of financial development in the region.
It has shown how readily available data on public firm ownership, boards of
directors, and price variations can be combined with basic information from in-
dividual names and other sources to generate a rich description of the political
economies of the region, and this synthesis has been enabled by new compu-
tational methods as well as the reform of financial markets. The main limita-
tions of this study are related to the quality of the data and the practicalities of
the model. Concerning the former, the informativeness of each pairwise syn-
chronicity observation is a direct function of the number of non-zero returns
upon which it is based, and the low liquidity of many markets in the region
means that the desire to estimate the model with as many data points as pos-
sible must be tempered by the realization that adding dyads with decreasing
numbers of non-zero returns will eventually contribute more noise than reliable
signal. Still, the cutoff described above is probably cruder than necessary, and I
plan to replace it with an appropriate weighting scheme in a future revision. As
for the model, its complexity is limited by the practicalities of computation, and
the model could be improved by allowing for heterogeneity in direct ownership
and industry effects, for example by disaggregating the latter into categories like
finance or resource extraction.
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CHAPTER 4
GUARANTEED LOANS, INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS,
AND BANK DECISION-MAKING IN CHINA (WITH LISHA LIU)
4.1 Introduction
Business groups have incentives and opportunities to use inter-firm transac-
tions in order to divert the resources from publicly-held firms toward their
closely held affiliates. On the other hand, such transfers might also serve an
important economic purpose beyond the enrichment of the group’s ultimate
controlling owners. The practice of firms guaranteeing the loans of other com-
panies is an important example of this type of transfer whereby the guarantor
firm agrees to assume some form of liability for the repayment of the loan in the
event that the recipient of the guaranteed loan defaults. These transactions thus
involve three distinct parties: the loan recipient, the guarantor who makes the
guarantee, and the bank providing the loan.
From the perspective of the lender, guaranteed loans can be problematic.
Although they can improve the distribution of capital by allowing smaller firms
to borrow at lower rates, the guarantor is often related to the recipient and hence
vulnerable to the same types of factors that might cause the latter’s default.
Furthermore, if the guarantor is publicly-traded, then the transaction will push
the risk of default onto its stockholders, resulting in an observable decrease in
firm value. This paper investigates the evolving role of guaranteed loans in the
Chinese economy from the perspective of the lenders’ varying sensitivity along
three dimensions: corporate governance, relationships between the guarantor
and bank, and the political capital of the guarantor.
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Using Bayesian multilevel logistic regression models, we find that better
governed firms are more likely to complete guarantees, that the influence of
political ties is contingent on the ownership of the firm, and that banks prefer
to make loans to well governed firms with which they have a history of inter-
action. These results have important implications for research on the role of
political ties in emerging markets, financial embeddedness, and the interaction
between business groups and their environment.
4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses
Our analysis of loan guarantees in China draws heavily from the literature on
related party transactions (RPTs) in China. As the name implies, these transac-
tions typically occur between firms that belong to the same business group or
are bound by other ties. However, loan guarantees can be distinguished from
other RPTs that involve direct transfers of capital, goods, and services from one
party to another in that they involve a third party, the bank making the loan.
Hence, evaluating a lender’s willingness to provide a guaranteed loan provides
an opportunity to characterize how these transactions are perceived by an ex-
ternal actor.
We model a bank’s decision-making strategy along three dimensions: the
corporate governance structure of the guarantor firm, the degree of financial
embeddedness between the bank and guarantor, and the political connections
of the guarantor. We also take advantage of China’s ongoing development into
an advanced market economy to assess how temporal and spatial variations in
marketization might influence the importance of these different factors. This
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section describes the motivation for our approach by first describing key el-
ements of the empirical context before summarizing prior research involving
each of the three classes of predictors. It concludes by presenting a set of hy-
potheses.
4.2.1 Guaranteed Loans in China
Although not all loan guarantees are RPTs, related-party guarantees comprise
over 90% of our observations. A loan guarantee to a related party refers to a
guarantee issued by one entity that it will ensure repayment of a loan made to
a related entity by a third party, usually a bank. In our data, the entity issuing
the guarantee is a listed firm and the loan recipient is typically privately held.
According to the Chinese Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP),
firms are defined as related-parties if one party controls, jointly-controls, or ex-
erts strong influence over another party or if two firms are under the control or
strong influence of a common third entity (Huang 2016).
A guarantee transaction involving a public firm typically proceeds as fol-
lows. First, the guarantee firm, which is the primary debtor firm that plans
to apply for bank loans, and the guarantor firm sign an intended guarantee
contract that will be submitted with the bank loan application of the primary
debtor firm. After receiving the loan application, banks further investigate the
borrower’s creditworthiness as well as the guarantor’s information and decide
whether to approve the loan. In the event of a default, banks will turn to the
guarantor firm for the repayment according to the terms of the contract.
The borrowing activities of public firms and their affiliates are also influ-
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enced by the unique history of business groups in China. Chinese groups have
emerged not only as a response to market failures but also as a direct result of
government policy (Keister 2001; Lee and Jin 2009). As a result, many busi-
ness groups in post-reform China remain state-owned and are directed by pro-
fessional managers, which contrasts with the well documented importance of
family owned groups in other parts of East Asia and the world (Luo and Chung
2005). A further idiosyncrasy is that China tightly regulates a group’s access to
equity markets, and in order to meet the listing requirements of the China Se-
curities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), a business group typically selects one
of its strongest firms and spins off low-performing assets to make it more at-
tractive to investors (Fisman and Wang 2010). This process is illustrative of the
governance issues faced by Chinese firms since the resulting improvement in
performance does not diminish firms’ incentives to support their less-profitable
affiliates rather than distribute surplus revenue to shareholders.
Over the past two decades, the Chinese government has implemented vari-
ous measures in order to mitigate these types of problems. For example, in June
2000 the Chinese securities market regulator introduced a regulation prohibit-
ing the issuance of any new debt guarantees to shareholders of listed firms or
to subsidiaries of these shareholders (Berkman et al. 2005). In 2004 the State
Council issued a directive specifically to address the expropriation of public
firm assets through RPTs stating, “We must prevent controlling shareholders
from embezzling listed company assets, and punish those who did.” (Jiang
et al. 2010). Finally, in 2005, China Securities Regulatory Commission intro-
duced a regulation mandating the disclosure of loan guarantees provided by
listed firms if a board or shareholders’ meeting has approved the intention to
offer the guarantee. This was soon supplemented by a 2006 revision of Arti-
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cle 36 of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to improve the
disclosure of RPTs more generally.
The Chinese Banking sector has also evolved significantly as China has be-
come more market-oriented. Historically, the Peoples Bank of China (PBC) was
the only bank in China, acting as a hybrid between a central bank and a com-
mercial bank (Lin and Zhang 2009). As part of market economy reforms from
1979 to 1984, the big-four state-owned banks—the Bank of China, the China
Construction Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China, and the Industrial and Com-
mercial Bank of China—were established. Further reforms introduced a series
of joint-stock or joint-equity banks (Liang et al. 2013). In 1994, the promulgation
of bank laws (i.e. the Central Bank Law and the Commercial Bank Law) and the
establishment of policy banks brought additional changes. Another exciting de-
velopment has been the emergence of regional commercial banks in both rural
and urban areas (Zhang et al. 2016). Nevertheless, the nature of state owner-
ship and its associated soft budget constraints continues to contribute to a large
proportion of non-performing loans in the Chinese banking sector (Allen et al.
2017).
4.2.2 Corporate Governance
This ongoing process of reform paralleled the development of a large litera-
ture on the relationship between corporate governance and RPTs. Although
the traditional concern of the corporate governance literature has been on the
principal-agent conflict between owners and managers, more recent work has
emphasized that many nascent financial markets across the world struggle im-
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plement any meaningful public control over openly traded firms (Porta et al.
2002; Morck et al. 2005; Aguilera and Jackson 2010; Davis 2012). This is because
after the public offering of shares the original owners of the firms often retain
an overwhelming large stake through mechanisms like ownership pyramids or
cross-holdings. This has two important implications. The controlling owner is
not obligated to seek the consider the opinions of other shareholders, and sec-
ond, they are less concerned about market reactions to firm behavior since only
a small fraction of the total equity is traded. This results in a reformulation of
the classic principal-agent dilemma as a conflict between two principals where
one has total control over the firm but both are entitled to a fair share of the
profits.
The most widely studied manifestation of this conflict of interest is “tun-
neling”, or the transfer of resources from a publicly held firm to a different
company more closely held by the listed firm’s controller (Bertrand et al. 2002).
Indeed, much of the literature on RPTs in China is devoted to improving our
understanding of this phenomenon (e.g. Jiang et al. 2010; Liu and Tian 2012).
However, the empirical identification of such expropriation can be problem-
atic. For example, redistribution among related parties has been shown to harm
high-performing firms in the short term, but there is also strong evidence that
group firms can reap important benefits from such mutual aid in times of crisis
(Lincoln et al. 1996; Almeida et al. 2015). Thus the impact of RPTs on economic
outcomes depends on the intent behind the transaction, which is largely un-
observed. Work on Chinese RPTs has approached this issue from a variety of
directions, for example by categorizing RPTs as efficient or harmful based on
market reactions, firm governance, or the current performance of the firm and
its affiliates (Fan et al. 2016; Berkman et al. 2010; Wong et al. 2015). By inves-
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tigating banks’ willingness to provide guaranteed loans, our study avoids this
difficulty and instead uses the outcome of a transaction to study how different
variables predict banks’ decisions. For example, Haveman et al. (2017) find that
political ties reduce firms’ ratio of intra-group loans guaranteed or provided to
those received. However, this could be the result of politically connected firms
applying for fewer loans, being rejected for more, or a combination of both, and
our study provides a direct test of this second mechanism for political ties as
well as corporate governance and financial embeddedness variables
The literature on the relationship between corporate governance and access
to capital in China has found a complex intersection of three dimensions: firm
attributes, the institutional environment, and political connections. Focusing
here on the first two, Firth et al. (2009) find that better governed private firms
have more access to bank credit. This reflects the endogenous relationship be-
tween credit and governance since not only are better governed firms less risky,
but firms that rely on debt rather than accumulated profits are also constrained
by the obligation of repayment to pursue higher value projects. However, there
is evidence that this latter mechanism does not apply to government-owned
firms (Tian 2005). In the case of public firms, the discrepancy between own-
ership and control rights of the ultimate controller is a direct measure of their
incentive to expropriate, and thus has important implications for their relation-
ship with creditors and shareholders (Zhang et al. 2014). A further variable
unique to China is the percentage of tradable shares, and Zhu and Zhu (2012)
find that the value penalty suffered by public firms engaging in RPTs decreased
after a series of government reforms designed to curtail firms’ proportion of
non-tradable equity and offer the explanation that the improved governance
caused firms to engage in fewer tunneling transactions. However, market-based
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governance mechanisms are not likely to be effective without a set of match-
ing institutions. For example, Chen et al. (2015) present evidence that the re-
lationship between governance mechanisms and guarantee issuance in family-
controlled firms is moderated by the marketization of firms’ provinces.
4.2.3 Political Connections
Ties between businesses and the state are of central importance in China, and
this relationship is typically operationalized along two dimensions, direct own-
ership by state entities and formal or informal relationships between business
leaders and government officials. From a bank’s perspective, a firm’s political
status might influence their decision making through at least two mechanisms.
First, political ties confer substantive advantages that might improve a firm’s
performance and make it less risky as a guarantor. For example, Li et al. (2008)
survey private firms about their party membership and find that affiliated firms
have higher performance, more faith in the legal system, and better access to
credit, and Haveman et al. (2017) report a similar finding whereby political ties
appear to benefit smaller publicly traded firms in competitive sectors.
This latter result echoes other studies that have noted the contingency of
the benefits of political ties. While private firms might benefit from the access
that such connections provide, they appear to enhance the ability of firms with
substantial state ownership to avoid market discipline and engage in more ex-
tractive RPTs (Wang 2015; Berkman et al. 2009; Wang et al. 2008; Tian 2005).
Furthermore, not all political connections are the same, and numerous studies
have found heterogeneous results for ownership by or relationships with local
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versus central government entities (Cheung et al. 2009; He et al. 2013; Liu et al.
2016). Indeed, direct government involvement in firm decision making can di-
rectly harm performance (Nee et al. 2007). Finally, the implications of a firm’s
relationship with the state also depends on their broader environment. It is a
standard practice for studies of political relationship in China to evaluate their
contingency on the marketization of a firm’s province, and most studies find
that the ongoing shift to market-based institutions appears to reduce the bene-
fits of government ownership (Carney et al. 2009; Calomiris et al. 2010; Li et al.
2008). Indeed, Nee and Opper (2010) provide evidence that political relation-
ships are only valuable to firms operating in industries with intense govern-
ment regulation, indicating that marketization has proceeded to the point that
such ties are no more beneficial than similar relationships in advanced capitalist
economies.
4.2.4 Financial Embeddedness
Compared with corporate governance and state-business relationships, the em-
beddedness of financial transactions within ongoing inter-firm relationships has
received less attention. This embeddedness is most commonly defined in terms
of the tendency for economic relationships to occur within a wider set of mul-
tiplex ties but can also refer to the ability of repeated transactions to develop
into a deeper connection (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1999; Sleptsov et al. 2013).
Previous research on financial embeddedness has demonstrated the capacity
of embedded ties to smooth firms’ access to finance and subsequent perfor-
mance. More specifically, entrepreneurs with embedded bank relationships can
overcome information asymmetry problems and establish noncontractual gov-
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ernance arrangements of trust and reciprocity that reduce banks’ uncertainty
and decrease their own cost of capital (Uzzi 1999; Uzzi and Gillespie 2002; Uzzi
and Lancaster 2003).
Although the focus of this work has primarily been on the relational dimen-
sion, the characteristics of an organization and its institutional environment are
also important to consider. Previous research on Chinas transitional economy
shows the interplay among economic rationality, social networks and institu-
tional links (Zhou et al. 2003). Within the context of the hybrid financial sector
in China, banks are engaging with multiple and often competing realities points
to bring about change and maintain stability in existing structures. For instance,
political and commercial logics co-exist for Chinese banks and banks of differ-
ent types value political capital and social capital differently. Carruthers and
Kim (2011) studied the U.S. financial system and found the importance of pol-
itics for many financial market developments and the continuing significance
of social factors within finance after the 2008-2010 financial crisis. To obtain
comprehensive insights into the role of social embeddedness on firms’ access
to financial capital, researchers need to take into considerations the alternative
channels through which firms can gain favors from banks.
Uzzi (1999) argues that it is important to study the development, use and op-
eration of ties within a wider context. Mizruchi and Stearns (2006) examines the
extent to which the effects of interfirm networks on the behavior of firms are his-
torically contingent and shows that in the US there is a decline of the influence
of interlocking directorate network on firms use of debt. Elfenbein and Zenger
(2014) present an empirical analysis that suggests that relational capital plays a
more important role in environments with more uncertainties. In a similar vein,
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Rangan (2000) argues that social networks systematically influence efficiency
when actors need to but cannot cost-effectively ascertain the identity and relia-
bility of potential exchange partners. The varying institutional environments in
China provide an opportunity for us to capture this dynamism.
4.2.5 Hypotheses
Loan guarantees, especially among related parties, have a checkered history
in China. Despite their economic rationale of encouraging banks to lend to
smaller, privately held firms, they are generally considered to reflect poor cor-
porate governance and to provide an opportunity for political and economic
elites to channel resources away from minority investors. However, following
decades of marketization and more recent reforms aimed at curbing the abuse
of guarantees and other RPTs, the availability of transaction-level information
on guarantee outcomes provides an opportunity to assess how firm attributes,
political connections, and embedded relationships impact the likelihood of the
bank approving the guarantee.
The three dimensions of a bank’s decision-making strategy—the corporate
governance structure of the guarantor firm, the degree of financial embed-
dedness between the bank and guarantor, and the political connections of the
guarantor—are important lines along which the bank assess the risk of a loan
guarantee. We expect to find evidence on the influence of each of these di-
mensions. However, the relative importance of these dimensions vary based
on the type of the bank that evaluates a loan guarantee application and the in-
stitutional environments. The hybrid financial sector and the regional differ-
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ences of the marketization level in China provide us an opportunity to explore
the relationships between the mechanisms . While political connections tend to
play a prominent role when the political logic dominants a large proportion of
decisions made by a bank, the quality of corporate governance may convey a
stronger signal to banks that operate mainly under the commercial logic. The
transition into a market economy could change the status quo of different actors
and therefore the value of social and political capital, as well as the signaling ef-
fect of good corporate governance practices. The role of financial embeddedness
has been documented in advanced capitalist economies and it may consistently
facilitate access to formal finance for Chinese firms as the economy became more
market-oriented. Based on the above discussion we present three sets of broad
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4: a) Banks are more likely to approve guarantees with better governed
guarantors. b) The relationship in a) is moderated by marketization. c) The association
will be weaker for state-owned banks.
Hypothesis 5: a) Banks are more likely to approve guarantees with guarantors whose
political connections indicate status and access to resources and less likely to approve
those indicating governance problems. b) The relationship in a) is moderated by marke-
tization. c) The association between political ties and guarantee signing is greater for
state-owned banks.
Hypothesis 6: a) The presence of multiplex ties and previous successful transactions
increases the likelihood of a completed guarantee. b) The relationship in a) gets stronger
with marketization. c) Because embeddedness depend on the accumulation of trust
through a history of positive interactions between two parties, the benefit of embedded
relationships will increase with the quality of governance of the guarantor firm.
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4.3 Data
The primary data set for this study is based on a file of over 100,000 guaran-
tee transaction records from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research
(CSMAR) databases collected by GTA. These records are based on a machine
coding of disclosures made by all firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges before 2016 in their annual reports or interim announcements. We
start our study on January 1, 2008 due to the fact that before the 2006 reform,
there is no representative data. After cleaning to remove duplicate transactions
and matching the records with other GTA data, this yields a data set of 18,125
guarantee transactions with non-missing data.
Our unit of analysis is a guarantor-guarantee-bank triad within a given
year. The dependent variable for our study is a composite measure indicat-
ing whether a guarantee contract was signed. This design is possible because
the 2006 reform applies to all intended guarantee transactions, and only 50% of
the 18125 unique attempts in our data showed evidence of being approved by
the bank. We considered guarantees to be signed if they were coded as such in
the GTA data or if the GTA data listed an actual, rather than intended, guaran-
tee amount. We verified this decision by comparing over twenty records with
their original disclosure documents provided by www.cninfo.com.cn and found
that the presence of an actual amount was a consistent indicator of a completed
guarantee transaction.
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4.3.1 Cleaning
A major challenge of this analysis was identifying unique transactions from the
raw disclosure records. Numerous transactions were recorded multiple times
as firms disclosed reaching new stages of the process and the different types of
disclosures often contain slightly different information. The first step in clean-
ing these data was to establish a best guess for the date of the attempt or actual
signing of a guarantee. We did so by preferring signing date, implementation
date, the date of approval by the board of directors or stockholder meeting, and
report dates, in that order.
Using this composite date, we grouped the transactions by a standardized
version of the names of the guarantor firm, the guarantee recipient, and the
bank and used a combination of the available date information, signing status,
loan amounts, and other covariates to distinguish between duplicate reports of
a transaction among the three firms and a series of multiple transactions oc-
curring within a short time. We deleted all duplicates and combined multiple
transaction within the same year by summing the loan amounts.
4.3.2 Merging
The standardized names used to group the guarantee disclosure records were
also used to match the organizations in our guarantee data with their appear-
ance in other GTA data sets. These included information on: public firms’ direc-
tors and interlocking firms; the top ten owners of each public firm; the control-
ling shareholder and ultimate controllers of each public firm; provincial mar-
ketization; the lending history of banks; and various bank and firm covariates
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such as size and performance.
Creating the standardized names from both Chinese and Latin characters
involved extracting individual firms from fields containing multiple organiza-
tions as well as accounting for systematic variations in firm names due to factors
like branch location. We also used a handmade data set of name variants that
refer to a common firm. This is especially important given that many of the
largest banks are frequently referred to by an abbreviated name of as few as
two characters.
4.3.3 Predictors
We measure the relationships between the guarantor firm, guarantee recipient,
and lender along two dimensions. First, we use a binary indicator of the pres-
ence of a direct or indirect ownership connection to measure the financial stake
that a bank might have in a guarantor. We measure interlocking directorates us-
ing a count of the number of triads linking the two firms. We also measure the
presence of a direct ownership or interlock tie between the guarantee recipient
and the guarantor.
We measure the embeddedness of the financial transactions between two
firms using the log of: the number of guarantees a bank has approved to a
guarantor, the number of guarantees that the bank has rejected involving the
guarantor, and the number of loans that the guarantor has applied for from the
lender. As shown in Table 4.3, the correlations between these variables are quite
high, which is to be expected since the number of successes and failures both
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N Local Ties Central Ties Other Ties
UC Private 9598 0.35 0.02 0.34
UC Local 5757 0.64 0.03 0.41
UC SOE 901 0.57 0.05 0.22
UC Central 1959 0.24 0.10 0.23
Table 4.1: Mean political ties by ultimate controller type.
depend directly on the number of attempts.1
We assess the evolving role of political connections in securing access to
guaranteed loans along three dimensions. First, we code each guarantor firm
based on the identity of its ultimate controller, which can be either a private
person or firm, a central government organization, a local government body, or
an SOE. Firms with a private ultimate controller are considered the reference
category. Second, we measure political connections using the log of the number
of central, local, and other government officials on the board of each guarantor
firm. Finally, we also employ the longitudinal NERI index of provincial marke-
tization to test the contingency of the impact of political capital on the progress
of reforms in a given location and time (Fan et al. 2017). Table 4.1 provides a
description of the number of transactions and mean political ties by ultimate
controller type.
We use three proxies for the corporate governance of each firm. Unlike in
advanced market economies where corporate governance is typically evaluated
with reference to specific firm policies that regulate the principal-agent conflict
between owners and managers (Davis and Greve 1997; Bhagat and Bolton 2008),
research in emerging or transitional markets instead focuses on the tension be-
tween controlling and minority shareholders that arises from the controller’s
1An alternative specification would be to use the number of attempts and the percentage of
failures or successes. We will evaluate this specification in a future version.
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contradictory desire to attract outside capital while maximizing their ability to
appropriate firm revenue. Hence, our three measures seek to capture various
aspects of this conflict. First, we use the log of the number of shareholders as a
proxy for dispersed ownership. Second, we use the percent of the firms shares
that may be freely traded as an indicator of the firm’s susceptibility to market
forces. This measure is especially important given that in 2005 the central gov-
ernment mandated that firms start to reduce their number of such closely-held
shares. Finally, we follow numerous studies in the literature on finance and cor-
porate governance in emerging markets by using the gap between an ultimate
controller’s voting and cash-flow rights in a firm (Boubaker et al. 2014; Gul et al.
2010; Claessens et al. 2000). In other words, we calculate ultimate controller’s
excess control by subtracting the sum of their direct ownership of a firm and
their indirect holdings via pyramid structures from the sum of the voting rights
in the target firm that they control directly or through proxies within the pyra-
mid.
We also investigate a relational dimension of corporate governance. Only
5.5% of guarantee transactions in our data take place between an unrelated
guarantor and recipient, but these observations allow us to assess banks’ reac-
tion to the absence of the conflict of interest created by transactions with related
parties. This measure is based on government-mandated disclosures and indi-
cates that the recipient is neither a member of the same business group as the
guarantor nor involved in an ongoing alliance or partnership. We also include
a measure to differentiate these partners from group members and treat group
comembership as the baseline.
Our final set of predictors are based on lender characteristics. We measure
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N Banks Total Mean Std. Min. Median Max.
SOE Bank 5 7344 1468.80 451.71 895 1444 2162
Joint Stock Bank 13 7638 587.54 472.75 10 550 1566
Commercial Bank 81 2790 34.44 58.66 2 17 435
Policy Bank 3 601 200.33 95.85 144 146 311
Other Bank 31 757 24.42 23.57 2 13 62
Table 4.2: Number of transactions by bank type.
bank size in terms of log assets and bank performance using the log of their
ratio of performing to non-performing loans. We also include indicators of the
type of each bank as either an SOE, a joint-stock bank, a policy bank, commercial
bank, or other. Table 4.2 describes the number of transactions and banks by bank
type. Table 4.3 provides summary statistics and correlations for the transformed
predictor variables.
4.3.4 Controls
In order to control for various forms of heterogeneity across time, location, and
industry, we include fixed effects for the year of the transaction, the province of
the guarantor, the industry of the guarantor, and the industry of the recipient.
This latter measure was not available from GTA, so we instead attempted to
parse the name of each recipient firm in order to search for relevant words and
phrases. Using this method, we were able to identify an industry for 7511 out of
18215 observations. The remaining 10704 transactions were coded as a residual
category rather than excluded from the analysis.
Other controls include the guarantee history of the recipient in terms of the
log of the number of successful and failed guarantees, the amount of guarantee
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requested in a given year, whether the recipient is a listed firm, the stock ex-
change on which the guarantor is traded, the type of guarantee (mutual, joint
liability, or collateralized); and the age, size, and performance of the guarantor
in terms of log years since foundation, log number of employees, log assets,
ROE, and Tobin’s Q.
4.4 Methods
We use a Bayesian multilevel logistic regression framework in order to estimate
the association between the above covariates and the approval of a guarantee
transaction. Compared with standard logistic regression models, which attempt
to derive point estimates for the coefficients and standard errors of each pre-
dictor by maximizing the likelihood of the data, a Bayesian logistic regression
combines the likelihood with prior information in order to draw a large num-
ber of samples from the resulting posterior distribution. More specifically, we
use a pooled design with random intercepts for both the guarantor and bank.2
This random intercept method is necessary to ensure the conditional indepen-
dence of observations with a shared guarantor or bank and is a mainstay of the
network analysis literature (Van Duijn et al. 1999; 2004). We chose a Bayesian
framework primarily because even simple versions of our model failed to con-
verge using standard frequentist software packages.
In addition to allowing for the convenient inclusion of random intercepts for
2We did not include a random intercept for the guarantee recipient for three reasons. First,
doing so would greatly increase the complexity of our model. Second, most recipients only
receive a guarantee from a single firm making it difficult to untangle the two. Third, we use
covariates on this guarantee history of each recipient to account for some of the unobserved
heterogeneity.
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each guarantor and bank, this framework also allows for the investigation of
how lenders’ sensitivities to different covariates might vary by bank. In other
words, it provides a compromise between assuming that all banks react sim-
ilarly to different stimuli and estimating a separate model for each lender by
assuming that each bank’s coefficient for a particular variable is draw from the
same underlying distribution. As a result, banks with few observations will
tend to cluster around the mean for the entire sample while the most active
banks will be assigned values that reflect their own potentially idiosyncratic
criteria for approving a guarantee.
Using this framework, we fit five distinct models. The first includes only
guarantor and bank random intercepts. The second includes all covariates and
interactions except those involving marketization. The third includes a marketi-
zation main effect as well as interactions with all the predictors of interest. The
fourth and fifth models allow for varying slopes among the corporate gover-
nance and embeddedness and political capital variables, respectively. In doing
so, we chose only those variables whose 90% credibility interval does not in-
clude zero. We estimated these varying slopes across two separate fits and us-
ing only significant predictors because the inclusion of additional varying pre-
dictors quadratically increases the number of parameters in the model due to
the necessity of estimating a correlation matrix with a row and column for each
variable.
We fit five separate pooled logistic regression models as follows:
ln(
P(yit = 1)
P(yit = 0)
) = αk + δl (4.1)
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ln(
P(yit = 1)
P(yit = 0)
) = βxT1it + αk + δl (4.2)
ln(
P(yit = 1)
P(yit = 0)
) = βxT2it + αk + δl (4.3)
ln(
P(yit = 1)
P(yit = 0)
) = βxT2it + γlz
T
1it + αk + δl (4.4)
ln(
P(yit = 1)
P(yit = 0)
) = βxT2it + γlz
T
2it + αk + δl (4.5)
where i refers to a unique combination of public firm k, bank l, and a guaran-
tee recipient, t is the year, α is public-firm intercept, δ is the bank intercept, β
is a vector of coefficients constrained to be constant across the entire sample, γl
is a vector of coefficients allowed to vary by bank, xT1it is a vector of covariates
without the marketization main effect and interactions, xT1it includes these addi-
tional predictors, and zT1it is a vector of containing predictors related to financial
embeddedness and corporate governance while zT2it contains variables related
to political capital.
4.5 Results
This section presents the entire-sample coefficient estimates from Model 3, pro-
vides a comparison between the mean coefficients of SOE and Joint Stock banks
from Models 4 and 5. and compares the observed data with predictions gen-
erated by Model 3. The main effects in Model 3 are similar in magnitude and
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significance to those in Model 2 as well as in the sample averages in Models 4
and 5. Table 4.4 gives the 95% credible interval and median value for the coef-
ficient of each financial embeddedness and corporate governance predictor as
well as their interactions with each other and marketization. Table 4.4 does the
same for each political relationships predictor.
Beginning with financial embeddedness, we find that the main coefficient
for number of previous signed guarantees is weakly negative, the number of
unsigned is close to zero, and the number of loans attempts is significantly
positive. The only significant interaction with marketization is the number of
previous unsigned attempts, which is positive. Taken together, these results
provide limited support for Hypothesis 6 in that the frequency of other interac-
tions between the firms appears to encourage guarantee relationships. In terms
of network ties, the main effect of ownership is close to zero, but firms from
more marketized provinces in fact appear less likely to receive guarantees from
shareholder banks. The density of interlock ties, however, has a weakly posi-
tive association that appears to increase for firms in more marketized provinces.
This could reflect a contrast between relying on ownership, which might cre-
ate a conflict of interest, and the density of shared director connections, which
might help facilitate trust and communication between firms. This appears to be
supported by the positive interaction between ownership and number of failed
transactions as well as the negative one between prior failures and the density
of interlock ties.
Turning to corporate governance and its interaction with the above vari-
ables, we find that the main effects of all three variables have the expected direc-
tion are non-zero within a reasonable certainty. The marketization interactions
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Coefficient 2.5% Median 97.5%
Market -0.33 -0.11 0.12
Prior Guarantees -0.34 -0.15 0.04
Market:Prior Guarantees -0.09 -0.02 0.04
Prior Failures -0.30 -0.07 0.17
Market:Prior Failures 0.06 0.13 0.21
N Loan Attempts 0.07 0.23 0.39
Market:N Loan Attempts -0.04 0.01 0.06
Bank Ownership -0.10 0.08 0.26
Market:Bank Ownership -0.11 -0.05 0.01
Prior Guarantees:Bank Ownership -0.23 -0.03 0.16
Prior Failures:Bank Ownership 0.06 0.29 0.52
N Loan Attempt:Bank Ownership -0.24 -0.10 0.05
Bank Interlock Triads -0.02 0.10 0.22
Market:Bank Interlock Triads -0.01 0.04 0.09
Prior Guarantees:Bank Interlock Triads -0.09 0.04 0.19
Prior Failures:Bank Interlock Triads -0.32 -0.13 0.05
N Loan Attempts:Bank Interlock Triads -0.18 -0.05 0.07
N Shareholders 0.05 0.20 0.34
Market:N Shareholders 0.08 0.15 0.22
N Shareholders:Prior Guarantees -0.08 0.05 0.19
N Shareholders:Prior Failures -0.37 -0.21 -0.05
N Shareholders:N Loan Attempts -0.07 0.02 0.11
Tradable Shares -0.05 0.37 0.77
Market:Tradable Shares 0.30 0.48 0.67
Tradable Shares:Prior Guarantees 0.50 1.05 1.60
Tradable Shares:Prior Failures -2.76 -2.04 -1.30
Tradable Shares:N Loan Attempts -0.10 0.29 0.70
UC Excess Control -3.11 -1.63 -0.12
Market:UC Excess Control 0.09 0.80 1.55
UC Excess Control:Prior Guarantees 0.19 1.47 2.71
UC Excess Control:Prior Failures -1.70 -0.11 1.51
UC Excess Control:N Loan Attempts -2.08 -1.06 -0.05
Unrelated Recipient 1.14 1.54 1.94
Market:Unrelated Recipient 0.32 0.54 0.76
Unrelated Recipient:Prior Guarantees 0.44 0.99 1.62
Unrelated Recipient:Prior Failures -1.52 -0.74 0.01
Unrelated Recipient:N Loan Attempts -0.96 -0.48 0.01
Table 4.4: Median and 95% posterior intervals for entire-sample coefficients related to financial
embeddedness and political ties.
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are significant with the expected positive sign, suggesting that well governed
firms from more marketized provinces are even more likely to receive guaran-
tees while poorly governed firms from the same areas are less strongly penal-
ized. These results provide strong support for Hypothesis 4. Interacted with
the financial embeddedness variables, we find that good corporate governance
appears to aid the formation of trust and stability through repeated exchanges
insofar as that firms with fewer non-tradable shares are more likely to benefit
from interacting with the same firm. A similar pattern holds for transactions
involving an unrelated recipient.
Table 4.5 shows the main effect and two- and three-way interactions between
the types of ultimate controllers (UCs), the log number of political ties, and
marketization. Marketization has the same non-significant coefficient, and the
associations between political ties and signing status for reference category of
private UCs are all close to zero in both their main effects and interactions with
marketization. Turning to publicly traded firms with local government UCs,
we find that they are no more or less likely than privately controlled firms to
receive guarantees, but appear to benefit strongly from the category of residual
political ties. This association diminishes with greater marketization. The third
UC category, that of other state-owned firms, provides surprising results. This
firms appear to be more attractive guarantors when they are located in more
marketized provinces, especially when they have connections to local politi-
cians. This suggests that the typical image of SOEs, especially those bound to
the conflicting interests of local politicians, as plagued by inefficiency and gov-
ernance problems perhaps no longer holds in more marketized areas. Finally,
high-status firms with central government UCs are more likely to receive guar-
antees, and marketization only increases the association. Given this strong main
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Coefficient 2.5% Median 97.5%
Market -0.33 -0.11 0.12
Local Political Ties -0.40 0.10 0.64
Central Political Ties -4.32 -1.17 1.89
Other Political Ties -0.80 -0.20 0.42
Market:Local Political Ties -0.24 -0.04 0.17
Market:Central Political Ties -1.53 -0.28 0.94
Market:Other Political Ties -0.12 0.11 0.34
UC Local -0.67 -0.09 0.46
Market:UC Local -0.29 -0.05 0.18
UC Local:Local Political Ties -1.14 -0.48 0.19
UC Local:Central Political Ties -3.57 -0.22 3.22
UC Local:Other Political Ties 0.41 1.30 2.22
Market:UC Local:Local Political Ties -0.30 -0.06 0.19
Market:UC Local:Central Political Ties -0.92 0.54 2.05
Market:UC Local:Other Political Ties -0.84 -0.53 -0.20
UC SOE -0.84 -0.08 0.67
Market:UC SOE 0.06 0.47 0.88
UC SOE:Local Political Ties -0.41 0.67 1.88
UC SOE:Central Political Ties -5.65 -0.90 4.12
UC SOE:Other Political Ties -1.04 0.33 1.71
Market:UC SOE:Local Political Ties 0.37 0.88 1.40
Market:UC SOE:Central Political Ties -2.61 -0.67 1.19
Market:UC SOE:Other Political Ties -1.86 -1.12 -0.37
UC Central 0.20 0.96 1.73
Market:UC Central 0.24 0.54 0.82
UC Central:Local Political Ties -2.40 -1.10 0.10
UC Central:Central Political Ties -2.58 1.29 5.29
UC Central:Other Political Ties -0.95 0.46 1.93
Market:UC Central:Local Political Ties -1.64 -1.07 -0.55
Market:UC Central:Central Political Ties -0.23 1.57 3.46
Market:UC Central:Other Political Ties -0.38 0.41 1.24
Table 4.5: Median and 95% posterior intervals for entire-sample coefficients related to political
connections.
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effect, it is perhaps unsurprising that most of the political ties coefficients have
little additional predictive power.
4.5.1 Variation Among Banks
Turning now to between-bank variation in the estimated coefficients in Models
4 and 5, Table 4.6 presents the distributions of the mean difference in coefficients
across the draws from the posterior distribution. In general there is little differ-
ence between the two groups, but three results are notable. First, joint stock
banks react more positively to guarantees to unrelated firms in the context of
repeated transactions and more market-oriented institutions. They are also less
prone to sign guarantees to firms with local UCs and political ties. They are,
however, more likely approve a transaction with a state-owned ultimate con-
troller with local ties from a more marketized province.
4.5.2 Predictive Checks
We carried out two predictive checks to evaluate the fit our model. First, we
checked the accuracy our predicted versus observed outcomes and found that
using a cutoff of 50% probability our model was correct in 85% of cases. Fig-
ure 4.1 shows the frequency of different predicted probabilities, defined as the
fraction of posterior draws in which that transaction was more likely to be
signed than not, grouped by observed signing status. Furthermore, the clus-
tering of observations at the two extremes of the plot indicates that the model
predicted many transactions with a high degree of certainty. Our models make
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5% Median 95%
N Shareholders -0.11 -0.02 0.05
Market:N Shareholders -0.00 0.04 0.10
N Shareholders:Prior Failures -0.09 0.02 0.14
Tradable Shares -0.06 0.15 0.54
Market:Tradable Shares -0.15 0.00 0.15
Tradable Shares:Prior Guarantees -0.20 0.01 0.30
Tradable Shares:Prior Failures -0.23 0.15 0.75
UC Excess Control -0.54 -0.01 0.35
Market:UC Excess Control -0.21 0.01 0.28
UC Excess Control:Prior Guarantees -0.23 0.10 0.85
UC Excess Control:N Loan Attempts -0.18 0.14 0.97
Unrelated Recipient -0.29 0.03 0.48
Market:Unrelated Recipient -0.03 0.14 0.49
Unrelated Recipient:Prior Guarantees -0.03 0.56 1.34
Unrelated Recipient:Prior Failures -0.26 0.09 1.00
Unrelated Recipient:N Loan Attempts -0.87 -0.11 0.19
UC Local:Local Political Ties -0.31 -0.06 0.06
UC Local:Other Political Ties -0.63 -0.33 -0.04
Market:UC Local:Local Political Ties -0.16 -0.05 0.04
Market:UC Local:Other Political Ties -0.08 0.05 0.24
Market:UC SOE -0.14 0.02 0.29
UC SOE:Local Political Ties -0.07 0.16 0.85
UC SOE:Other Political Ties -1.26 -0.15 0.67
Market:UC SOE:Local Political Ties 1.12 2.32 3.91
Market:UC SOE:Other Political Ties -0.47 0.01 0.47
UC Central -0.09 0.00 0.14
Market:UC Central -0.07 -0.00 0.03
UC Central:Local Political Ties -0.49 -0.02 0.34
UC Central:Central Political Ties -0.93 0.17 1.92
UC Central:Other Political Ties -0.42 0.06 0.81
Market:UC Central:Local Political Ties -0.39 -0.03 0.13
Market:UC Central:Central Political Ties -2.40 -0.60 0.56
Market:UC Central:Other Political Ties -0.51 0.04 0.74
Table 4.6: Median and 90% credible intervals for the mean difference between Joint Stock and
SOE bank coefficients.
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Figure 4.1: Mean predicted outcome across all posterior draws versus actual signing status.
heavy use of firm’s institutional environment. However, this value varies both
with province and year, suggesting that unobserved factors common to a par-
ticular location in a given year might confound these coefficient estimates. Fig-
ure 4.2 compares the predicted proportion of signed guarantees in each province
in 2008 and 2015 to the corresponding observed success rate and provides the
percentile rank of the observed proportion relative to the distribution of pre-
dicted values. The model appears to give a reasonable fit for most cases, but
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there are enough examples of poor fit to suggest that making better use of over-
time variation will improve the fit of the model. We plan to implement a fully
longitudinal model in a future revision.
4.6 Discussion
Our study uses transaction-level information to shed light on how banks re-
spond to various measures of firm governance, inter-firm relationships, and po-
litical connections. Our perspective assumes that Chinese banks, which operate
under close supervision of the state, have internalized the government’s de-
sire to reduce the expropriation of minority shareholders through related party
transactions and hence will prefer to provide guaranteed loans when they per-
ceive them as less risky and less likely to serve as a means of tunneling. Overall,
our findings are consistent with prior work but also include novel results that
add nuance to our understanding of the role of various institutional logics in
emerging markets in general and China in particular. This section will parse
the output of our models in more detail before describing the limitations of our
approach and possible improvements.
We find broad support for the importance of corporate governance and each
of the main effects has the expected sign. These associations are moderated by
marketization in that the coefficients of indicators of relatively minor conflicts of
interest between controlling and minority shareholders increase in magnitude
in more market-oriented provinces. However, our sole measure of poor gover-
nance, UC Excess control, has a positive interaction with marketization perhaps
indicating that firms’ interactions with market-based institutions can mitigate
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the ultimate controllers’ incentives to expropriate.
Our analysis of the embeddedness of these transactions in a wider array of
multiplex ties paints a more complicated picture. In terms of repeated interac-
tions, the main effects of Prior Guarantees, Prior Failures, and Bank Ownership
all close to zero. The number of prior loans sought by the guarantor from the
bank is associated with a higher chance of approval, and there is weak evidence
that a greater density of interlock connections makes a bank more willing to
lend. When interacted with provincial marketization, the coefficients for Prior
Guarantees and N Loan Attempts are close to zero. The interaction with own-
ership is weakly negative, indicating that banks perhaps prefer to avoid their
own conflict of interest when dealing with firms from more developed areas.
Interlock density, however, appears to become more important in more market-
orient areas, which would be consistent with the role of interlock ties as chan-
nels of communication and reputation-building. Finally, Prior Failures has a
strongly positive interaction with Marketization. This could be due to the fact
that banks have a quota of the number of loans they may make to a given firm,
and when searching for new loan recipients they appear to prefer not just the
firms they have previously rejected, but only those from more developed areas.
Our next set of results concerns the interactions between corporate gover-
nance and repeated transactions. Reflecting the idea that trust builds up over
the course of repeated positive interactions, we find somewhat mixed evidence
that firms less apparent conflicts of interest are more likely to be approved by
banks with whom they have a history of interaction. However, there is also a
positive interaction with UC Excess Control. The high correlations among Prior
Guarantees, Prior Failures, and N Loan Attempts, however, complicate the in-
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terpretation of these coefficients since the positive interaction between UC Ex-
cess Control and Prior Guarantees would be somewhat offset by the interaction
with N Loan Attempts.
The role of political connections in securing guaranteed loans appears even
more convoluted. They appear to be completely irrelevant for privately held
firms at any marketization level. When considering public firm guarantors
with a local government ultimate controller, we find evidence in favor of the
central prediction of market transition theory, namely that political ties become
less salient with increased marketization. However, we find the opposite trend
among transactions involving firms with an SOE ultimate controller. In more
marketized areas, not only do such firms appear more likely to have their ap-
plication approved, but the also benefit more from ties with local politicians.
In contrast, their ties with other miscellaneous state entities seem to become a
liability in more developed provinces. Finally, firms with ultimate controllers
affiliated with the central government are more likely to receive guarantees in
general and increasingly so with more marketization.
Finally, our models also provided us with the opportunity to evaluate banks’
varying sensitivity to the above factors. Our expectation was that state-owned
banks would give more weight to political connections while joint-stock banks,
which are more subject to market discipline, would rely more on firm gover-
nance and embedded relationships. Our results show that coefficient values do
not differ significantly between the two groups with three exceptions. The first
two provide support for the above hypothesis insofar as SOE banks give more
weight to the political ties of local government firms while joint stock banks
are more receptive to guarantees made to unrelated parties. A more surpris-
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ing result is that the positive coefficient of the interaction between marketiza-
tion and local political ties for firms with SOE ultimate controllers is largely
due to joint stock banks, not their state-owned counterparts. One explanation
for this finding, especially when contrasted with the uniform preferential treat-
ment received by central government firms, is that UC SOE firms have under-
gone meaningful reforms that make their political capital more of an asset than
a liability.
The uniqueness of our data set has allowed us to test the relevance of numer-
ous factors at the transaction level, but our study nevertheless has important
limitation, some of which are inherent in the data. First and most seriously, our
analysis is largely limited to an investigation of bank and guarantor characteris-
tics despite the fact that the guarantee recipient is arguably the most important
actor in the transaction. We have tried to mitigate this issue by inferring the
guarantee firm’s industry where possible and by including variables on the re-
lationship between the guarantor and the guarantee recipient, but we still lack
relevant data on the recipient’s performance or governance structure. Second,
when cleaning our data, we were able to identify over 60,000 unique transac-
tions. However, only 25,000 of these provided information on the identity of
the lender, which was necessary in order to derive our variables on guarantor-
bank relationships as well as bank characteristics. This could create a potential
selection bias, which we will explore in subsequent work. Finally, posterior pre-
dictive checks of our model have found that it does not always accurately pre-
dict the proportion of approved guarantees in a given province in a given year,
which suggests that a fully longitudinal model might be more appropriate.
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4.7 Conclusion
Our results are consistent with the literatures on corporate governance and po-
litical ties in China insofar as they demonstrate a growing reliance on market-
based governance mechanisms and a complex, evolving role for political con-
nections. We also contribute to the growing literature on the sociology of finan-
cial markets in China by testing the role of embeddedness in facilitating guar-
anteed loan transactions, and found evidence for the relevance of multiplex ties
in facilitating exchange, especially for better governed guarantors.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This dissertation has sought to provide answers to a series of questions
regarding the relationships among firm governance, inter-organizational net-
works, business groups, and financial markets. In Chapter 2, I find that there
is evidence that the results of the community detection procedure for inferring
business group membership do indeed correspond to socially meaningful clus-
ters. Chapter 3 bolsters this finding by providing showing that the influence of
the inferred business groups can be detected in a separate network of pairwise
stock return correlations. Finally, the results from Chapter 4 present a compli-
cated picture of the variety of forces at work in China’s financial sector. Firm
governance, political ties, and financial embedded all predict the approval of a
loan guarantee to varying degrees. There is also limited evidence that different
types of banks respond differently to different factors.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX: COMMUNITY DETECTION
The community-detection procedure used in this paper can be broken down
into three steps. First, I adapted the multiplex modularity function described in
Equation 2 to fit bipartite and directed networks. Next, I implemented New-
man’s 2006 leading-eigenvector method as a heuristic for identifying a high
quality partition. Finally, I refined this partition using two separate runs of a
modified Kerrighan-Lin algorithm and also ensured that the resulting partitions
were connected.
In its most general form, the modularity of a given partition and network is
proportional to the total weight of observed ties minus the expected value for
all potential edges in the network. The key contribution of Mucha et al. (2010) is
the principled elaboration of this basic equation to include manually specified
connections between the same node in different networks. The specific form of
this elaboration does not vary with network type. Thus adapting the modularity
function to analyze bipartite and directed networks only requires the correct
specification of the expected value of each potential dyad and the appropriate
normalization.
The standard modularity equation for undirected networks is
Q =
1
2m
∑
i j
(
Ai j − γkik j2m
)
δcisc j (A.1)
where 2m =
∑
i j Ai j and ki equals the sum of the weights of all of the edges
involving node i, δi j is the Kroenecker delta such that δi j = 1 if i = j and 0
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otherwise, γ is the resolution parameter, and ci is the index of the community of
vertex i (Newman 2006).
In directed networks the expected value of a tie is similar, but rather than
use the overall degree of each node, the likelihood of an edge in each direction
is proportional to the indegree of the target nodes as well as the outdegree of
the source node, as in Equation A.2:
Q =
1
m
∑
i j
(
Ai j − γ
kini k
out
j
m
)
δcisc j (A.2)
where Ai j is the weight of the edge from originating at i and ending at j,
m =
∑
i j Ai j, kini =
∑
j Ai j, kouti =
∑
j A ji, and γ, δi j, and ci are as defined above
(Leicht and Newman 2008). This alternate specification allows the algorithm to
distinguish between nodes with many incoming versus outgoing ties; and in
more concrete terms it minimizes the impact of ownership edges originating at
owners that have holdings in a large number of public firms, such as institu-
tional investors, just as it will maximize the import of an edge ending at a node
with a small number of owners. This last point is especially important given the
pruning of owners with only one connection to the broader network. Because
of this editing, the expected values for each edge are not derived from the over-
all ownership data for a company, but rather from the what those data tell us
about the underlying relational structure of public firms. As a result, a multiplex
community-detection algorithm used on the edited data will be less likely to as-
sign a weakly connected node in the ownership network to its own community,
and instead focus on the nature of its connection to the broader ownership struc-
ture, as well as its position in the director-firm affiliation network. The ability
to rely on the director-firm network to help resolve such ambiguous situations
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is an important strength of the method.
Finally, bipartite networks are defined by the presence of two disjoint sets
of nodes that may only form ties with nodes of the other type, so for example
in our director-firm affiliation network directors may not be connected to other
directors, but only to firms. Of course, there are certainly important social con-
nections between directors, so our network is bipartite only insofar as it focuses
on a specific type of relationship, namely employment as a member of the board
of directors. The modularity function for bipartite networks explicitly models
this restriction by assigning an expected value of zero to edges between nodes
of the same type, as show in Equation A.3:
Q =
1
2µ
∑
i j
(
Ai j − γbi j kik jm
)
δcisc j (A.3)
where Ai j, m, ki, γ, δi j, and ci have the same definitions as in the undirected net-
work and bi j = 1 if i and j are not the same type and 0 otherwise (Barber 2007).
Note that the denominator of the expected edge weight is m instead of 2m. This
reflects the fact that the probability of a tie between two nodes is higher than in
an undirected network with a single type of node, conditional on knowing that
the two nodes are of different types.
After identifying the appropriate modularity equations, the next step is to
choose the γ and ω parameters and combine all three elements to form the over-
all multiplex modularity function given in Equation 2. As described in Sec-
tion 2.3.4, I chose to set γ = 1 and ω = 1. This equation is then used to create the
modularity matrix B. A final adjustment is to add the modularity matrix to its
transpose and divide by 2. This ensures that the modularity matrix is symmet-
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ric, but does not change the results of the analysis since it is not possible for i to
be in the same partition as j while is j not in the same partition as i.
From this point any one of a number different heuristics can be used to find
a high-quality partitioning, and I used Newman’s (2006) leading-eigenvector
method with two additional refinements. As the name implies, this method
uses the eigenvector of B corresponding to the largest eigenvalue as an ap-
proximation of the optimal two-way partition of the graph. Thus, nodes with
a value less than zero are assigned to one group and the remaining nodes to
the other. This approximation provides a good first guess about the best split,
and the next step recommended by Newman (2006) is to refine the partition ac-
cording to the KL-algorithm, which switches the partition assignment of each
node exactly once by choosing the unmoved node that would yield the high-
est increase or smallest decrease in modularity. It then returns the intermediate
partition with the highest modularity (Kernighan and Lin 1970). This process is
repeated until no improvement is found. Next, I added the step of checking that
the resulting partitions are in fact connected across both networks, or in other
words that it is possible to reach a node from any other node in the partition
using only intra-community ties. If partitions were found to be disconnected,
I flipped the partition assignment of each node outside the largest component
until no unconnected nodes remained. I do not have a full explanation for why
the algorithm would otherwise occasionally return disconnected partitions, but
it might be related to the form of the bipartite modularity equation, which does
not penalize lumping together unconnected nodes of the same type.
Next, each of the two partitions is further subdivided and refined until doing
so does not yield an increase in modularity. This is done using a modified subset
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of the original modularity matrix, B(g), such that B(g)i j = Bi j − δi j
∑
k∈g Bik for all
i, j ∈ g. After identifying these indivisible partitions, I performed a final set of
KL-refinements using a community-level network where a partition is a node
and edges are weighted by the number of ties between vertices in each partition.
More specifically, I began with the pair of partitions with the greatest number
of connections and shuffled nodes between them as described in the previous
paragraph. I then moved to the partition dyad with the next highest number of
connections and so forth. After exhausting all the community-dyads with more
than one shared edge, I repeated the process until no changes were made. I also
employed this process to refine the higher-level location based partition.
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